Was the USA right to drop the Bomb on Japan to end WW2?

by stillajwexelder 131 Replies latest members politics

• 

  SixofNine

  Another "no" (or at least a "shoulda done it different") from one of the people in the mix:

  ~~~JOSEPH GREW

  (Under Sec. of State)

  In a February 12, 1947 letter to Henry Stimson (Sec. of War during WWII), Grew responded to the defense of the atomic bombings Stimson had made in a February 1947 Harpers magazine article:

  "...in the light of available evidence I myself and others felt that if such a categorical statement about the [retention of the] dynasty had been issued in May, 1945, the surrender-minded elements in the [Japanese] Government might well have been afforded by such a statement a valid reason and the necessary strength to come to an early clearcut decision.

  "If surrender could have been brought about in May, 1945, or even in June or July, before the entrance of Soviet Russia into the [Pacific] war and the use of the atomic bomb, the world would have been the gainer."

  Grew quoted in Barton Bernstein, ed.,The Atomic Bomb, pg. 29-32.
• 

  SixofNine

  You boys like war don'tcha? Well this guy was the secretary of war! lol, ok, assistant secretary of WAR!

  ~~~JOHN McCLOY

  (Assistant Sec. of War)

  "I have always felt that if, in our ultimatum to the Japanese government issued from Potsdam [in July 1945], we had referred to the retention of the emperor as a constitutional monarch and had made some reference to the reasonable accessibility of raw materials to the future Japanese government, it would have been accepted. Indeed, I believe that even in the form it was delivered, there was some disposition on the part of the Japanese to give it favorable consideration. When the war was over I arrived at this conclusion after talking with a number of Japanese officials who had been closely associated with the decision of the then Japanese government, to reject the ultimatum, as it was presented. I believe we missed the opportunity of effecting a Japanese surrender, completely satisfactory to us, without the necessity of dropping the bombs."

  McCloy quoted in James Reston, Deadline, pg. 500.
• 

  SixofNine

  This guy was right in there, gettin' jiggy wit da Japanese:

  "I submit that it was the wrong decision. It was wrong on strategic grounds. And it was wrong on humanitarian grounds."

  Ellis Zacharias, How We Bungled the Japanese Surrender, Look, 6/6/50, pg. 19-21.

  ~~~ELLIS ZACHARIAS

  (Deputy Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence)

  Based on a series of intelligence reports received in late 1944, Zacharias, long a student of Japan's people and culture, believed the Japan would soon be ripe for surrender if the proper approach were taken. For him, that approach was not as simple as bludgeoning Japanese cities:

  "...while Allied leaders were immediately inclined to support all innovations however bold and novel in the strictly military sphere, they frowned upon similar innovations in the sphere of diplomatic and psychological warfare."

  Ellis Zacharias, The A-Bomb Was Not Needed, United Nations World, Aug. 1949, pg. 29.

  Zacharias saw that there were diplomatic and religious (the status of the Emperor) elements that blocked the doves in Japan's government from making their move:

  "What prevented them from suing for peace or from bringing their plot into the open was their uncertainty on two scores. First, they wanted to know the meaning of unconditional surrender and the fate we planned for Japan after defeat. Second, they tried to obtain from us assurances that the Emperor could remain on the throne after surrender."

  Ellis Zacharias, Eighteen Words That Bagged Japan, Saturday Evening Post, 11/17/45, pg. 17.

  To resolve these issues, Zacharias developed several plans for secret negotiations with Japanese representatives; all were rejected by the U.S. government. Instead, a series of psychological warfare radio broadcasts by Zacharias was later approved. In the July 21, 1945 broadcast, Zacharias made an offer to Japan that stirred controversy in the U.S.: a surrender based on the Atlantic Charter. On July 25th, the U.S. intercepted a secret transmission from Japan's Foreign Minister (Togo) to their Ambassador to Moscow (Sato), who was trying to set up a meeting with the Soviets to negotiate an end to the war. The message referred to the Zacharias broadcast and stated:

  "...special attention should be paid to the fact that at this time the United States referred to the Atlantic Charter. As for Japan, it is impossible to accept unconditional surrender under any circumstances, but we should like to communicate to the other party through appropriate channels that we have no objection to a peace based on the Atlantic Charter."

  U.S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Conference of Berlin (Potsdam) 1945, vol. 2, pg. 1260-1261.

  But on July 26th, the U.S., Great Britain, and China publicly issued the Potsdam Proclamation demanding "unconditional surrender" from Japan. Zacharias later commented on the favorable Japanese response to his broadcast:

  "But though we gained a victory, it was soon to be canceled out by the Potsdam Declaration and the way it was handled.

  "Instead of being a diplomatic instrument, transmitted through regular diplomatic channels and giving the Japanese a chance to answer, it was put on the radio as a propaganda instrument pure and simple. The whole maneuver, in fact, completely disregarded all essential psychological factors dealing with Japan."

  Zacharias continued, "The Potsdam Declaration, in short, wrecked everything we had been working for to prevent further bloodshed...

  "Just when the Japanese were ready to capitulate, we went ahead and introduced to the world the most devastating weapon it had ever seen and, in effect, gave the go-ahead to Russia to swarm over Eastern Asia.

  "Washington decided that Japan had been given its chance and now it was time to use the A-bomb.

  "I submit that it was the wrong decision. It was wrong on strategic grounds. And it was wrong on humanitarian grounds."

  Ellis Zacharias, How We Bungled the Japanese Surrender, Look, 6/6/50, pg. 19-21.
• 

  Buster

  Yup. It was the right thing to do.

  1. The Japanese had been inflicting heavy caualties as the US moved in on Japan. They showed no signs of letting up, even when the war was an obvious lost cause. We were just gonna lose more boys.

  2. We dropped two. That is important because they didn't capitulate after the first one. Nope, a complete destruction of a whole city and its inhabitants was not enough. We had to do it again. If they knew we were fresh out of nuclear bombs, I doubt they would have surrendered. How else were we to end this war?

  3. We needed to select the fastest available method. They were starving prisoners.

  4. We did 'em a favor.
• 

  SixofNine

  hmmm, who to believe, who to believe? *scratches chin*
• 

  fleaman uk

  Chappy

  Where did you get that info?Ive never heard of most of what you say?Any links?

  Thanks.
• 

  chappy

  Fleaman,

  You are correct in questioning the info. I should have provided references.

  I've been interested in ww2 history for most of my life and most of my information comes from non-internet sources. The planned use of more atomic bombs is something I learned just recently on a History Channel International documentary. I'm certain the info. is available online so I'll do a little research and provide link(s) in a day or so. If I'm not mistaken, the entire invasion plan is now available on the net.

  Was it the A bomb info or the coup attempt that you weren't familiar with?

  chappy
• 

  minimus

  I already said, yes.
• 

  Peppermint

  I can see how you reason yes.
  
  But to me aggressive acts always create more negatives. Some will say, ?It saved the world from further bloodshed? how can you know that? All we know is the world is in a mess now.
  
  So I say. Give peace a chance.
• 

  onacruse

  Hello peppermint

  All we know is the world is in a mess now.

  I submit that the world has always been a mess. Even the phantasmical Garden of Eden was a mess, when one considers the "behind the scenes" struggles that the Bible itself admits were happening, even as just 2 (just two) humans were supposedly enjoying idyllic peace. And what about the animals, and plants, and bacteria? They were, even in that Paradise, ruthlessly killing each other, eating each other, taking over each other's territory, struggling for existence, with no qualms whatsoever about the immorality.

  Why? Because this universe is structured, from the most fundamental physical laws on up, to be a constant struggle between powers. E.g., gravity fights against electromagnetic radiation (emr)--bends it, limits it. For the time being, there's still a lot of emr around us, and so it looks like a stand-off...but, in the end, gravity will crush emr out of existence (or, at least, out of existence in this unvierse).

  In that respect, the posts above about the role of religion in such human struggles reflect the reluctance we have to admit that simple fact to ourselves. We like to think that there is more to life than POWER (especially because most of us don't have a measurable amount of POWER), and so we invent these constructs to evaluate (and usually to condemn) the behavior of those few that do have POWER.