@no-zombie
May you please first read my comment (and the link within the comment) HERE regarding the histocity of the Genesis narrative?
Your question is actually aimed at why God allows evil, this is the problem of theodicy, which has been written about many times and by many people, it would not hurt to clarify a few questions here theologically.
God does not desire moral evil or sin for its own sake or for the sake of others; He merely permits it. This is a dogma in the Catholic Church. The Council of Trent excommunicates anyone who, like Calvin, claims that "it is not within man's power to turn to evil, but God performs evil deeds just as He does good ones, and does so in a special sense, and not merely by permission; so much so that Judas' betrayal is no less God's own work than Paul's calling."
Both Testaments firmly oppose the notion that God is the author of sin or that He associates with it in any way. The Lord "has not commanded anyone to act wickedly, and He does not give permission to sin. He does not desire a multitude of unfaithful and useless children" (Sirach 15:20; Wisdom 12:10). "Indeed, my God, you do not delight in wickedness" (Psalms 5:5). "The Lord detests the way of the wicked" (Proverbs 15:9). "God cannot be tempted by evil, nor does He tempt anyone" (James 1:13).
However, Scripture often speaks as if God were the cause of evil: He hardens people's hearts, blinds them, sends deceitful spirits; the crucifixion of Christr happened according to God's plan. Solution: Scripture presents God in absolute holiness, as the avenger of sin, with such definitiveness that it cannot intend to contradict itself with the cited passages. Rather, it could mean that God intended the hardening, etc., as punishment, or that He intended to make the wickedness of the obdurate sinners evident. Furthermore, Scripture emphasizes two opposing truths with full determination and energy: God's absolute holiness and omnipotence (nothing happens without the sovereign God's decree) and does not concern itself with reconciling these two truths. Scripture thus proves to be a supernatural cosmos that not only provides solutions but also raises new and significant problems. Specifically, Scripture does not yet employ the concept of permission to express more accurately God's omnipotence over sin, but rather uses the most direct and illustrative concept available (the concept of causation).
The curses in the cursing psalms do not originate from God, but they are inspired because they express a zeal for God's cause.
The understanding of the Church Fathers is clearly evident from the determination and tenacity with which they opposed Manichaeism, whose main teaching was that all evil, including sin, is the direct and specific work of an absolute principle. It is not difficult to comprehend with reason that God cannot desire sin. God desires everything for Himself; the formal object, or motive, of His love is Himself. However, sin is a turning away from God; God cannot desire His creatures to live without Him, or even against Him. In other words, sin is absolute evil; no good can equal it since it frustrates the eternal goal of spiritual creatures: reaching God, which is the absolute, unsurpassable good. However, the permission of sin does not contradict the absolute holiness of God's will. This only means that God does not prevent moral evil. God can do this if it serves a proportional motive (e.g., emphasizing the freedom of creatures) and if it does not frustrate the ultimate goal of creation, i.e., if God can turn it to good.
Regarding objects in various theological contexts, the divine will is usually classified as follows:
Necessary and free will: depending on whether its object is God Himself or freely created creatures. The following classifications all pertain to God's free will, which can be:
Simple and ordered will (voluntas simplex et ordinata): depending on whether it is directed towards the ends of creation or its means; the ordered will presupposes the setting of goals. Thus, God desires the manifestation of His glory with simple will and the efficacious graces of the elect with ordered will. This generally corresponds to the distinction between the absolute and conditional divine will; the latter being a divine decision that takes into account the cooperation of free creatures. Similar is the distinction between effective and ineffective will, which comes into consideration in the distribution of grace: God's saving will is called effective as far as human free will cooperates with it; otherwise, it is ineffective.
Antecedent and consequent divine will (voluntas antecedens et consequens): According to Thomas Aquinas, the antecedent divine will disregards concrete circumstances, while the consequent takes them into account. According to Molinists, the antecedent will precedes the good or bad use of human free will, while the consequent follows the foresight of the free choice. This distinction is significant in the doctrine of predestination.
Internal will (will of complacency) and signified will (voluntas beneplaciti et signi): The will of complacency considers God's will as it is in Himself; the signified will is actually a manifestation of the divine will observable in creation, which is metonymically called will (just as a will is called "last will"). Five such divine will-manifesting signs are usually listed: command, prohibition, permission, counsel, and action (praecipit et prohibet, permittit, consulit, implet). These signs, however, do not equally express God's will. Action always accurately expresses the divine will: what God does, He also wills. Permission in itself is not willing, as we have seen regarding moral evil. Command, prohibition, and counsel sometimes do not express God's entire will, as in the command to sacrifice Isaac. In this sense, we can speak of God's revealed and hidden will. However, it is completely erroneous, even blasphemous heresy, to believe, like Calvin, that there could be a contradiction between God's hidden and revealed will; as if, for example, God openly willed everyone's salvation, but secretly only the salvation of the elect. In general, great wisdom, supernatural enlightenment, solid and profound knowledge of God and humanity, and great humility are needed to determine or at least sense what God's will is, especially in concrete situations and difficult life tasks (e.g., career choice). Only frivolity disguised as piety dares to label every personal idea and action as God's will and even impose it on others as such.
These classifications, however, only pertain to the divine will considered in its results or endpoints (terminative). In God Himself, His absolute nature excludes the idea that He would decide without taking all possible factors into account; as if He would consider something purely as a goal, abstractly, or conditionally, or only in certain phases, and therefore, what He wills would not always be precisely fulfilled. The above distinctions are only offered by His works for the human mind bound to discursive thinking.
The Molinists accuse Thomism of making God the author of evil, insofar as, according to the doctrine of physical premotion, God precisely predetermines the physical aspect of sin, which is, however, inseparable from the moral aspect. If God precisely predetermines every movement of the murderer, with which he thrusts the dagger into his victim's heart, it is difficult to see how God cannot be considered a participant in the murder. To this, the Thomists rightly respond: According to Molinism, God also cooperates with the physical part of the sinful act, with every single detail. If this accompanying cooperation is not incompatible with God's holiness, then the premotional cooperation cannot be incompatible either; because, like the accompanying cooperation, it also targets only the physical element of sin, which is not sinful in itself. If it is permissible for God to provide assistance in the act of murder while it is happening, it is also permissible for Him to predetermine it in advance; in both cases, naturally, assuming that there is a real distinction (distinctio saltem virtualis maior) between the physical and moral elements of sin. Thomism further reasons as follows: Sinfulness, as such, is the lack of proper moral alignment. Its source is human fallibility (defectibilitas); and this ultimately stems from the limited judgment suggested by the fallible will. When God provides His indispensable creative premotion, He respects the will He created (as fallible) and, according to His universal law of providence, grants the necessary creative cooperation even to sinful acts, but only to the elements that pertain to existence and are therefore good in themselves. That an act deviates from proper moral alignment is due to the weakness of the will that initiated the act; just as if someone's leg is crooked, their soul is the initiator and cause of their walking, but not of their limping, which results from the defect of the leg.
Since Providence is universal, evil is also part of its plans. However, because evil runs counter to rational creatures, especially humans, who are the objects of God's special Providence, it is a deeply crucial question: how does evil fit into Providence? To answer this question meaningfully, we should distinguish between strictly physical evil, psychic evil (suffering; both together being physical evil in a broader sense), and moral evil (sin).
Strictly physical evil in the realm of inanimate nature involves conflicting opposites (e.g., plants and frost; coal seams and mine fires), catastrophes, and destructions (volcanoes, storms, star deaths, Earth's cooling), and chemical decompositions. In themselves, these are not evil; they only become evil because they are sources of suffering for humans and animals. They greatly enrich the picture of creation and reveal various aspects of God's excellence. Additionally, they are inherent in the concept of the material world. Thus, God could have willed and included them in His universal plan of Providence just as He willed a material world governed by the present laws to declare His inner richness.
Regarding psychic evil, suffering, we should again make distinctions. The suffering of animals has been illuminated in the assessment of pessimism.
Regarding human suffering, even a philosopher who meditates solely on the natural world can determine that God did not will suffering for its own sake, but rather for the goods associated with it. This means that one can find perspectives that clarify this question: why did God arrange the world's course so that it entails so much suffering for humans. Namely, a) suffering is suitable for eliciting values from the depths of the human soul that would otherwise remain forever hidden, such as submission, endurance, assistance, and consolation, compassion. Pain itself, with its often shocking outbursts and sometimes quiet sorrow, brings the grandeur and depth of tragedy into existence. Thus, it indeed plays a role in creation like shading in a painting: it highlights the colors and deepens and enriches the artistic effect. b) Suffering is temporary. According to natural reason, eternal life awaits the just in the afterlife; compared to which the greatest earthly suffering is a mere trial. Experience shows that the greatest pain becomes bearable as soon as we are assured that it will end at a definite near time.
Supernatural illumination presents suffering in a completely new light: a) In the actual order of salvation, God's extraordinary gifts were meant to keep humans away from all suffering and significantly reduce the suffering of animals. Death came through sin, and with death came its attendants: misery, disease, and pain. Thus, in the current order of salvation, suffering has a punitive character. However, punishing sin is a providential activity. b) Since Christ sanctified and made suffering meritorious through His own passion, every sufferer has the opportunity through grace to supplement in their body what is lacking in Christ's afflictions (Colossians 1:24), and in this sublime mystical way, make temporal sufferings valuable for eternal life and, through psychological means, make it a means of purification.
Therefore, even if the just suffer in this earthly life (this was a severe problem for the pious in the Old Testament: Psalms 73; Job 21:7; Jeremiah 12:1. The solution is given by the Fathers: Augustine, City of God, 1; Chrysostom, especially Homilies on the Statues 1, 8; Letter to Olympias.), or suffer not precisely for personal sins, even finding themselves in a worse state than the godless or those with a lax conscience, they have no reason to doubt God's special Providence for a moment. For many of the just's sufferings would not be avoidable without frequent and significant interruptions of the natural order, or miracles (great catastrophes, the universal destruction of plagues); moreover, God raises His sun on the good and the evil alike (Matthew 5:45); inherited burdens, for example, could not be suspended for the just without miracles. But Providence, as the organic continuation of the Creator's activity, generally does not want to disturb the established order of nature unless it is necessary due to God's wisdom, goodness, or justice; there is indeed no just person who does not need the atoning and especially the educating blessings of suffering (see Hebrews 12:1-13. "ὁ μὴ δαρεὶς oὐ παιδεύεται," who has not walked the school of sufferings remains uneducated, says the Greek philosopher; and Goethe chose this as the motto for his autobiography). Conversely, there is no wicked person who does not deserve some good; and since eternal life only brings punishment for them, it is understandable if God rewards them in this life. When fully appreciating divine justice, one must never disregard the otherworldly recompense. It is a blessing for the just to follow in their Savior's footsteps: "If we suffer with Him, we will also be glorified with Him" (Romans 8:17).
Thus, the believer does not face suffering with the same dullness as the pagan masses. They do not need to resort to the false and, especially in difficult situations, inadequate fakir self-narcotization of Stoic ἀταραξία (unperturbed calm). Nor will they be tempted to reach for the less realistic euphoria-chasing of our time (εὐφορία, good feeling), which places pleasure at the center of life values and tries to avoid suffering with modern technical, medical, and social inventions and arrangements. Nor do they need to adopt the primitive standpoint of the Old Testament: suffering as a punishment for hidden sins or a short trial followed by ample earthly compensation (Job and Tobit's standpoint; Wisdom already refers to the otherworldly recompense). For the believer, the key to all suffering is the cross; the meaning of Holy Week is revealed on Easter morning.
Moral evil, or sin, by its nature, is something God cannot will, not even indirectly, as He does with suffering; He can only permit it. Why does He permit it? What is the purpose of sin in God's providential plans? Only revelation can clarify this question, offering the following perspectives:
a) The possibility of sinning is inherent in the concept of a free creature; and since a creature that "could sin and did not sin" (Sirach 30:10) is a good and significant new creative idea, God could have willed to create such a being. All the more because, otherwise, creation would have had to do without the very creature that can consciously fulfill the goal of creation: the conscious glorification of God. Intelligence involves freedom, and created, non-absolute freedom involves the possibility of sinning.
b) Although God has the power to prevent every sin with efficacious graces without infringing human freedom, He saw it good to allow freedom to be exercised negatively as well. For α) Sin also presents entirely new aspects of creation and the Creator: the depths of repentance, the mercy of forgiveness, the solemn majesty of punitive justice, and God's inexhaustible patience are all revealed by sin. Saint Augustine says: "God would not have created a single angel or human whose wickedness He foresaw if He had not also foreseen how to use them for the benefit of the good, thus adorning the order of the ages like a beautiful poem with certain contrasts." "The painter knows where to place the black color to make his painting beautiful; and should not God know where to place the sinner to make His world orderly?" β) The main point: The order of sin should not be viewed abstractly but taken as it is actually integrated into the current order of salvation. Here, the reality is that God would not have permitted sin if He had not already (in idea, secundum ordinem naturae) determined its sublime reparation through redemption by incarnation. Assuming that the incarnation happened solely in view of sin, the sublime mystery of the incarnation and all the good that comes with it can, in a way, be attributed to sin: "O felix culpa, quae talem ac tantum meruit habere Redemptorem!" (Exultet of Holy Saturday).
5. As certain as it is that all our paths and deeds are in the hands of the providential God, and that every difficult situation comes from His hand, as certain as we can be that even in the greatest abandonment and difficulty, God's tender and powerful hand leads (Psalms 55:23; 1 Peter 5:6), so certain it is that often in a given case, we cannot determine why divine Providence acts precisely this way.
Facing an unexpected great individual or national calamity, or a severe trial of the Church, we can only echo the Apostle's words: "Oh, the depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are His judgments and how inscrutable His ways!" (Romans 11:33). Christ energetically warns against hastily and presumptuously interpreting God's thoughts, especially regarding calamities. When His disciples questioned Him about the man born blind: "Who sinned, this man or his parents, that he was born blind?" He replied: "Neither this man nor his parents sinned, but this happened so that the works of God might be displayed in him" (John 9:2). On another occasion, He instructs the disciples prone to quick conclusions that the Galileans killed while offering sacrifices were not more sinful than other Galileans; similarly, the eighteen who died when the tower in Siloam fell on them (Luke 13:1–5). No individual or historical situation, even one under special Providence, provides a sure basis for predicting or calculating precisely the direction of Providence (see Judas's betrayal, the Church's frequent humiliations, etc.).
The faith of many pious people in Providence, and even in God, suffers shipwreck because they engage in such false calculations or expect extraordinary Providence in a situation where they should humbly submit to the ordinary. Saint Augustine aptly characterizes this mindset, which does not understand Providence and therefore denies its wisdom: "If an unskilled person wanders into a workshop, he sees many tools whose purpose he does not understand; if he is very foolish, he deems them unnecessary. If he burns himself or injures himself with a sharp tool, he considers them harmful. However, the master knows their purpose, smiles at the fool, and pays no attention to his foolish remarks but steadfastly continues his work. And behold, people are such fools: in the case of a craftsman, they rarely dare to criticize what they do not understand but assume that everything they see in his workshop is in order and useful. However, regarding the world's creation, of which we proclaim God as the creator and ruler, they dare to criticize much that they do not understand, acting knowledgeable about the Almighty Master's works and tools, while their ignorance is evident."
We see only a tiny fragment of God's ways; our knowledge barely encompasses the present, even less of the past, and nothing of the future. It would be great audacity to try to construct their entire course from this. Divine wisdom guarantees only that however unfathomable the ways of Providence may be to us, they are not in vain: "God's ways may be hidden, but they cannot be wicked." In any difficult situation, it is always enough to know the universal law: He does not tempt us beyond our strength (1 Corinthians 10:13). And in any abandonment, one can always, with the strong arms of faith and love, grasp God and not let go (Tauler's beggar); and "if God is for us, who can be against us?" (Romans 8:31).
