Blotty
I was talking about Hebrew, where the "H" (he, ה) is often pronounced softly, and is practically silent at the end of a word. So they mark the "H" but often don't pronounce it. Thus, when pronounced, Yahweh sounds: /ˈjɑː(h)weɪ/ - thus a weak, almost silent [h] in in the middle, and silent one at end, and the "e" pronunced long, like in the word "café".
In Greek, it is just the other way around, [h] is not spelled out, but pronounced, but not strongly, like the letter J in European Spanish.
The biblical names are inteed spelled and pronounced differently today in modern languages than they were in their time. E.g. Yirməyāhū -> Yeremias -> Jeremiah. But these names are not sacred names in the sense that the Holy Tetragrammaton is. If you really want to utter it, you can definitely do it only the way it was originally done, or at least in the form closest to it. So the English "J" is an impossibility just because there is no "J" sound in Hebrew.
Can you say to that, but then the name of Jesus is not sacred? Yes indeed, on the other hand, there is already a biblical precedent for the Greekization of his name, since the New Testament itself establishes that we do not call him Yeshua (or Yeshu) according to the original pronunciation, but as Iēsous in Greek, Latin Iesus let, develop this further in other languages, such as "Jesus" in English. However, there is no biblical precedent for such a pronunciation-changing transliteration of Yahweh's name.
In fact, the entire denomination of Jehovah's Witnesses is a very good example of how correctand the logic of the Jews was regarding the non-pronunciation: on the one hand, the JWs pronounce it wrong, they have no liturgy (so liturgical use is out of the question, what remains is, in fact: profane), and they don't even understand its content (which means that he is "Who Is", not the one who "becomes" into this and that). The purpose of the name YHWH was to educate the Jews on monotheism and the pure theistic understanding that he is the transcendent absolute, the actus purus. In comparison, the JW image of God is antopomorphistic.
In the Gospels, Jesus applies Psalm 110 to himself differently than Paul later applies to him in the epistle. By definition, Jesus took on human nature only at the time of his Incarnation, before that he was only God. Therefore, if the pre-existent Son is David's Lord, it can only be understood in terms of his divine nature.
At the same time, according to Jewish interpretation, David wrote the Psalm 110 in the third person about himself, to be sung by the Levites in the Temple in Jerusalem, from a Jewish perspective the Levites would be saying that "the Lord spoke to my master", i.e. to David.
However, at the same time, Jesus as a human Messiah-King received the title "Lord" due to his ascension to heaven, and the so-called communicatio idiomatum (communication of properties) also comes into play here, which means due to the hypostatic union, divine and human attributes can be asserted about the person of Christ according to his divine and human nature. The ἰδίωμα, ἰδιότης is a reality aspect in Christ, which is characteristic of one nature excluding the other. Since Christ is the personal, independent, and self-possessed owner of the divine and human natures, and ultimately the subject of every statement is the independent entity (suppositum, hypostasis) in the order of being, therefore the two sets of predicates (the divine and human attributes) can be communicated through the person, so that divine attributes can be asserted of Christ who is human, and human attributes can be asserted of the same Christ who is God. This is the communicatio idiomatum (κοινοποίησις, ἀντίδοσις ἰδιωμάτων, ἰδιοτήτων).
The bearer of the two natures is the eternal Son, the person of the Logos. Only those who assume two subjects in Christ, like Nestorianism, can oppose it. Indeed, it was against this that the Church had to expressly defend the communication at the Council of Ephesus (Mary may be called the God-bearer, "theotokos"), after the Church had already widely practiced it in the Apostolic Creed and elsewhere.
This manner of speech is used in the New Testament books (Lk 1:35; Jn 1:14; Acts 3:15; Rom 1:3; 9:5; 1 Cor 2:8; Phil 2:6), and can also be found in early church documents. The Scripture not only asserts divine and human attributes about the same one Christ in various places, but also in one sentence: "They crucified the Lord of Glory" (1 Cor 2:8; cf. Rom 8:32, Acts 3:15, 20:28, 1 Jn 3:16); and conversely: "Jesus said to them, 'Before Abraham was, I am'" (Jn 8:58; cf. 3:13).
Theological consideration finds that the interchangeability of attributes directly follows from the dogma established by the Council of Chalcedon: "two distinct natures in one person". If Christ is indeed one independent entity and two sets of predicates (divine and human) can be pronounced about him, they can be communicated through the common subject. If, however, Christ is two subjects, of course, there is no place for a real communication (Nestorianism). And if Christ is not only one entity, but also one God-man nature, the attributes themselves also intermingle, become God-man, and again, a true statement communication is impossible (Monophysitism). From this follows the rules of the interchange of attributes, the knowledge and conscientious consideration of which is so significant for correct Christological thinking and expression.
Basic rule: If we name Christ either from some aspect of the divine or the human nature with a concrete name (not an abstract name; which includes the names about the parts of Christ's humanity in substance, if not in form, such as: Christ's body, soul, imagination, etc.), we can assert divine attributes of Christ named on the basis of humanity and human attributes of Christ named on the basis of divinity. Therefore, it is permissible to say: The Son of God was hungry, cold, born of a woman, suffered; Jesus of Nazareth, the son of the Virgin Mary, is omniscient, omnipresent, etc. Since the ontological basis of the communication of properties is the personal unity of the man Christ with the Word, every communication that feeds on Nestorian or Monophysite thought is erroneous.
In ancient Christological debates, Gregory of Nyssa already differentiated between the use of concrete and abstract concepts (Contra Eunomium 5). Augustine regularly elaborated on the possibilities of assertion. When debating with Nestorians, the distinction played a role in determining to what extent Mary can be called Christ-bearer and to what extent she can be called God-bearer (theotokos). They went so far as to assume that there were essentially two persons in Christ, the divine and the human, and these were only incidentally united with each other. Against them, Cyril of Alexandria fought particularly. The Monophysites formally did not deny the communicatio idiomatum, but they gave it a meaning that indicated a mixture of the two natures. Adoptionism rejected the communicatio idiomatum. John of Damascus saw the basis for the hypostatic union in the mutual permeation of the two natures.
In the Middle Ages, Scholastic theology developed the appropriate rules from traditional elements:
1) The properties of the two natures can be asserted about the same subject.
2) The basis for interchangeability is one person, not the two natures, therefore it is not valid in the opposition of the two natures (e.g., it cannot be said that the deity died on the cross)
3) The interchangeability is only understandable if the concrete is related to the concrete, but not if we connect the abstract to the abstract or to the concrete.
4) The testimonial statements must be formulated absolutely about the person of Christ, with negative ones supplemented restrictively.
5) Statements about the establishment of personal unity cannot be applied to Christ as a man.
These rules help to express faith correctly and point to the mystery of the incarnation.
