One thing I believe I
should have added to my last post detailing the political leanings of the
(almost) stillborn Korean People’s Republic was this: It is sometimes stated
that the speed with which ordinary Koreans formed associated grassroots
structures was itself evidence of Communist influence. The
reasoning here is that no-one else had the necessary organizing skills to form
these grassroots organisations so quickly. I can’t comment as to whether or not
the Korean Communist groups had such widespread organising skills. They may
have, or they may not have, had such skills.
But it is not necessary to
look past an existing community system in East Asia, the system is known in
China as Hukou and often translated as “household registration.” In Japan it is
called koseki, and it seems to be the
(possibly) traditional system which the Japanese used as a basis for the their 1940
action of organizing all of Korea into some 350,000 ‘Neighbour Patriotic
Associations. Each basic grouping consisted of ten households and became the basic unit for a variety of Japanese government programs such as
collecting contributions for the war effort, recruitment of labour, rationing
and maintaining local security.
These groups would still
have been in existence in 1945 and as Japanese control collapsed, could quickly
have become the basis for the local ‘peoples committees’ of the ‘Committee for
the Preparation of Korean Independence.’ To me that’s a far simpler explanation
for the speed with which these ‘peoples committees’ were established, to the
more difficult explanation that somehow the various Communist groups were so
well organized that within three months they had the numerical strength to form
and control these grassroots committees.
We can now examine, why
the Korean People’s Republic failed, at least in part.
The USA and USSR were
allies in WW2, not because of any great love for each other, but for entirely
pragmatic reasons. But time was to show that the alliance was an aberration.
Between 1918 and 1920,
the USA had sent a contingent of 9,000 troops to Siberia to support the
rightwing White Movement and its goal of crushing the Russian Revolution. That war
effort failed, defeated by the communist’s Red Army and in 1922, the USSR came
into operation, However, generally the USA and most Western Powers had an
anti-Communist stance.
As already noted,
pragmatism brought something of a change in attitude during WW2. During the war
it seems the ‘West’ was willing to cede some territory to the USSR if the USSR
would enter the Pacific theatre of the war and help defeat Japan. The death of
Franklin Roosevelt, the ascension of Truman to the Presidency, the successful
development of a nuclear weapon, the imminent defeat of Japan and maybe most of
all, the successful Russian entry into the war and its capture of vast amounts
of East Asian territory seems to have caused a re-think in American government
circles.
No-one in the American
government seems to have had much concern for the Koreans from the time of the
previously mentioned Taft-Katsura Memorandum of 1905 until Japan finally
surrendered. The text-book Korea: Old and
New suggests that the USA was willing to allow the USSR control of all of
Korea and Manchuria in return for participation in the war against Japan. And,
as events turned out, nothing could have prevented the USSR military from
taking control of all of Korea in August 1945. An American army contingent
could not have been moved into Korea in time to prevent a Soviet occupation of
all of Korea.
On August 10-11 1945, at
a meeting of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee a decision was made to
attempt the division of the Korean Peninsula into two separate occupation
zones. It was decided to try and make the dividing border the thirty-eighth
parallel, because it placed Seoul in the American zone. The offer was put to
the Russians, and to the surprise of the American planners the Russians agreed.
Even so, it took until September 8 for an American military force to arrive in
Korea.
So there at last we see
the beginnings of the present stand-off between North and South Korea. Both
occupation forces were confronted with the existence of the KPR, the Korean
people’s own preference.
How would the two
military occupational forces react to the nascent formation of a free and
independent Korea?