One thing I believe I should have added to my last post detailing the political leanings of the (almost) stillborn Korean People’s Republic was this: It is sometimes stated that the speed with which ordinary Koreans formed associated grassroots structures was itself evidence of Communist influence. The reasoning here is that no-one else had the necessary organizing skills to form these grassroots organisations so quickly. I can’t comment as to whether or not the Korean Communist groups had such widespread organising skills. They may have, or they may not have, had such skills.
But it is not necessary to look past an existing community system in East Asia, the system is known in China as Hukou and often translated as “household registration.” In Japan it is called koseki, and it seems to be the (possibly) traditional system which the Japanese used as a basis for the their 1940 action of organizing all of Korea into some 350,000 ‘Neighbour Patriotic Associations. Each basic grouping consisted of ten households and became the basic unit for a variety of Japanese government programs such as collecting contributions for the war effort, recruitment of labour, rationing and maintaining local security.
These groups would still have been in existence in 1945 and as Japanese control collapsed, could quickly have become the basis for the local ‘peoples committees’ of the ‘Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence.’ To me that’s a far simpler explanation for the speed with which these ‘peoples committees’ were established, to the more difficult explanation that somehow the various Communist groups were so well organized that within three months they had the numerical strength to form and control these grassroots committees.
We can now examine, why the Korean People’s Republic failed, at least in part.
The USA and USSR were allies in WW2, not because of any great love for each other, but for entirely pragmatic reasons. But time was to show that the alliance was an aberration.
Between 1918 and 1920, the USA had sent a contingent of 9,000 troops to Siberia to support the rightwing White Movement and its goal of crushing the Russian Revolution. That war effort failed, defeated by the communist’s Red Army and in 1922, the USSR came into operation, However, generally the USA and most Western Powers had an anti-Communist stance.
As already noted, pragmatism brought something of a change in attitude during WW2. During the war it seems the ‘West’ was willing to cede some territory to the USSR if the USSR would enter the Pacific theatre of the war and help defeat Japan. The death of Franklin Roosevelt, the ascension of Truman to the Presidency, the successful development of a nuclear weapon, the imminent defeat of Japan and maybe most of all, the successful Russian entry into the war and its capture of vast amounts of East Asian territory seems to have caused a re-think in American government circles.
No-one in the American government seems to have had much concern for the Koreans from the time of the previously mentioned Taft-Katsura Memorandum of 1905 until Japan finally surrendered. The text-book Korea: Old and New suggests that the USA was willing to allow the USSR control of all of Korea and Manchuria in return for participation in the war against Japan. And, as events turned out, nothing could have prevented the USSR military from taking control of all of Korea in August 1945. An American army contingent could not have been moved into Korea in time to prevent a Soviet occupation of all of Korea.
On August 10-11 1945, at a meeting of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee a decision was made to attempt the division of the Korean Peninsula into two separate occupation zones. It was decided to try and make the dividing border the thirty-eighth parallel, because it placed Seoul in the American zone. The offer was put to the Russians, and to the surprise of the American planners the Russians agreed. Even so, it took until September 8 for an American military force to arrive in Korea.
So there at last we see the beginnings of the present stand-off between North and South Korea. Both occupation forces were confronted with the existence of the KPR, the Korean people’s own preference.
How would the two military occupational forces react to the nascent formation of a free and independent Korea?