To undisfellowshipped,
Sorry, but again your last response was too long to deal with deeply, so I'll be terse here again:
Your definitions of metaphysical naturalism are good enough for a broad understanding. I'll mention again there are many different forms of naturalism, some broadly and some narrowly defended.
An evidential scientistic naturalism would more accurately be stated as follows:
"Since by observation most things are best understood naturally, then probably as a provisional belief, those things which lack full natural explanations due to limitations on observation are very likely natural as well."
Now, even taking your naturalism definitions, your attempts to understand the "case for naturalism" show that you have not consulted any of the carefull, patient and exhaustive scholarship on the issue.
1. Your premise (1) cannot be verified. Please stop using it. It is not representative of either a consensus of most naturalists or as a fact of physics.
2. Calling a physical law mindless is tautological and not needed. Whether you call it "purposeless" is a different matter. Under one common understanding of the meaning of "purpose," a natural law is completely purposeful. Functionalism may be a minority opinioin. You would be more accurate to say "non-teleological."
3. Your third premise uses "chance." Here again you would do well to consult the dirth of literature on "chance," "randomness," etc. There are innumerable responses here, such as natural necessity.
4. To evolution should add "and other means" after natural selection, even to be very concise.
5. Your premise "5" contains many "intensifiers" which seem to me to indicate your judgements about relatively neutral concepts. The jump here to morals has several mistakes, such as "realizing they had a responsibility." A responsibility is sort of a metaphysical claim. Here the language you are using proves your opponents conclusion false not by virtue of the argument, but by virtue of shifting the terms.
I don't like the shell game of "faith" here. It is the opinion of most naturalists that their conclusion is one drawn from evidence, not that they are believing dispite a lack of evidence.
You have again skirted past the obvious criticisms of the evidential argument from evil.
The atheist or naturalist, without her own argument for morals, can in debate use the same presuppositions of theists for what good and evil are because her objection is an argument from LOGICALLY INTERNALLY INCONSISTANT PROPERTIES. These arguments can establish that either (A) God, were he to exist, cannot posess certain traits or priorities in conjunction with other traits. (B) Were God to exist, no meaningful knowledge about his qualities can be inferred either from nature or from the scriptures. (C) Probably, God does not exist.
Theists have defended against this time and again. The usual approach is to defend a God with characteristics different from what most people believe in and divorced from any consensible basis in the scriptures.
So please, please please stop saying an atheist cannot rightly use the term "evil" or "good."
Your defenses don't hold up. Your defense of God would make him either not all-powerful or else not fully-rational, or at least would posit the existance of ADDITIONAL eternal, timeless metaphysical constraints on the deity.
Some theisims can defend against the evidential argument, others cannot. This is a very important distinction to make. For example, this argument does prove that VERY probably Jehovah does not exist or else that Jehovah's Witnesses are false. Islam, for example, is completely unphased by this argument.
Finally, the theists problem in the moral argument is that you have a baseless, shifting, circular and arbitrary definition of the terms of the argument about morals. If good is "whatever god does" and whatever god does is "good" then your claims to morals are preposterously NON-OBJECTIVE. Further, biblical morals are NON-CONSENSIBLE. There is not a single important moral principle in the bible which isn't broadly contested and reinterpreted among theists in balance with other factors.
