Iraqis in Iran (free from US military) express their support for Saddam

by Elsewhere 16 Replies latest social current

  • freeman


    Gitasat, I always thought that in the technical sense only members of the Semitic people of the Arabian peninsula could be considered Arab, however in the context of colloquial speech, many more people consider themselves Arab, even those not indigenous to the Arabian peninsula.

    I tend to look at it that this way: People consider the bubbling wine in their glass Champaign regardless of its origin, when technically Champaign comes from only one small part of the world, and everything else is just sparkling wine.

    I guess it depends on your point of view. I’m not dogmatic about it either way but if you try telling that to a few of the people that I work with, they may get kind of upset because they do in fact consider themselves Arab even though they do not originate from the Arab peninsula. Interesting post, thanks for your thoughts.


  • Gerard

    They have sucumbed to Iranian propaganda that the USA is against ALL Moslem countries. Be careful...

  • gitasatsangha

    Freeman, I think to some extent it is looked at from a languge and cultural manner as much or more then by ethnicity and religion. Arab nations and peoples pretty much cover the areas that were under the Caliphs. (well.. not Spain, anymore). So groups as wide apart as Morocco and Iraq are arab nations. However within these nations are many subgroups, like Berbers, Tuaregs, Amazigh, and so forth that might even be completely ethnically distinct.

    In the broader muslm world there are non-arab majority-muslim nations, like Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iran, Turkey, Uzbekistan, Indonesia, Mongolia, Pakistan that might side with Arab nations when it looks like the Arabs and/or Islam is threatned, but who ultimately have no love lost for the arab nations.

  • heathen

    Soon they can be just like the US with a trillion dollar debt unemployment, inflation . welcome to the 21st century.

  • outnfree

    Geez, Elsewhere and Gerard!

    Did you even READ the article?

    All of the expatriate Iraqis mentioned in the article OPPOSE Saddam Hussein's regime. They are storming embassies to try to find information on themselves and loved ones who may have been targeted by the Iraqi secret police. And, of course, to tell Saddam and his diplomats to shove it! ;)


  • Sara Annie
    Sara Annie
    Elsewhere, I suggest you re-read paragraph four of the press item; these expatriate Iraqis are not supporters of Saddam.
    Did you even READ the article?

    I assumed the title of the thread was employing the use of irony, given Elsewhere's politics...

  • ThiChi

    ""The United States certainly has inflicted a massive blow on the

    Arab, if not the Islamic, psyche. The only comparable moment was

    in June 1967, when Israeli forces defeated the Egyptians, Syrians

    and Jordanians. It should be remembered that the defeat had

    unintended consequences: Not only did Egypt and Syria attack

    Israel with some effect in 1973, but the consequences of the

    defeat energized the Palestinian movement. The Israelis have

    begun warning the Palestinians to think through the lessons of

    Iraq. On the other side, the United States must carefully think

    through the lessons of 1967.

    The simplistic idea that resentment of the United States will

    generate effective action by Arabs misses a crucial point. Two

    scales are at work here: the radicalism scale and the hope scale.

    On the radicalism scale, the level of radicalism and anti-

    Americanism in the Arab world has been off the chart for months.

    Increasing the level would be difficult. However, radicalism by

    itself does not lead to action. There must also be hope -- a

    sense that there are weaknesses in the U.S. position that can be

    exploited, that there is some possibility of victory, however

    distant. So long as the hope scale tends toward hopelessness,

    radicalism can be intense.

    The United States was prepared to allow the radicalism scale to

    go deep into the danger zone, but Washington has been trying to

    keep the hope scale deeply in the green zone. Israel's failure

    after 1967 was inherent in its position: The Israelis depended

    heavily on outsiders for national security. The Arab perception

    was that the Israelis could be attacked by splitting them from

    their patrons. This sense of vulnerability led to an active

    response to defeat.

    The task facing the United States now is to avoid projecting a

    sense of vulnerability. This is easier for Washington than it was

    for Israel. The United States comes out of the war less dependent

    on others; it also has a strong domestic consensus in favor of

    the war. The United States presents, at the moment, a seamless

    face to the Arab world: It is hated but feared. Washington now

    must act now to maintain the fear, while reducing hatred. How it

    manages Iraq will determine the outcome. If the United States

    loses control of the situation, it quickly could lead to a

    perception of vulnerability. It must control the situation in

    Iraq while maintaining a benign administration. This will not be

    as easy it sounds: Where Washington can choose between

    unrelenting strength and the risk of perceived weakness, it will

    have to carefully choose strength. That is implicit in the


    >From a geopolitical perspective, we already have seen the United

    States transiting from the Iraqi war phase toward confrontation

    with the surrounding states. Saudi leaders capitulated in

    fundamental ways before the United States went to war, permitting

    U.S. aircraft to fly air strikes against Iraq and allowing U.S.

    forces to pass through Saudi territory. Jordan and Kuwait are not

    problems. But there are three issues: Syria, Turkey and Iran.

    * Syria: Syrian behavior has become unpredictable. The Syrians

    have long understood that, as a consequence of the war, their

    country would be surrounded by three enemies: the United States,

    Turkey and Israel. Rather than trying to reach an accommodation

    with the United States, Damascus stepped up its aggressive

    behavior during the war, permitting volunteers to go into Iraq to

    fight coalition forces and apparently permitting Iraqi personnel

    to seek shelter in Iraq. The Bush administration has made it

    clear that it finds Syrian behavior intolerable, and Defense

    Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has refused to rule out assertive

    action against Syria. There was no question but that the United

    States was going to confront Syria at some point from its bases

    in Iraq, but the Syrians seem to have chosen to accelerate the

    process -- perhaps feeling that a better settlement could be

    reached earlier in the game.

    * Turkey: Washington needs to defuse the bad end to the pre-war

    confrontation. Turkey is a geopolitical foundation of U.S.

    strategy -- not only in the Middle East, but also north of the

    Caucasus, in southeastern Europe and Iran. A permanent rift with

    Turkey would be intolerable. Similarly, the United States remains

    the foundation of Turkish national security policy. Without it,

    Turkey has fundamental problems. The two countries may not be

    friends at the moment, but they share fundamental interests. Both

    nations now will attempt to extract themselves from the

    unacceptable situation they created for each other. The key will

    be limiting Kurdish expectations.

    * Iran: the extraordinarily complex game that Tehran is playing

    makes Syrian foreign policy transparent. Iran has positioned

    itself in such a way that its pro-Iranian Shiite groups in Iraq

    could wage a guerrilla war against the United States, while

    Tehran holds open the possibility of reaching implicit

    accommodations with the United States -- all at the same time.

    Iranian subtlety notwithstanding, Washington regards Iran as the

    single most potentially dangerous regime in the region, because

    of both its resources and the complexity of its politics and

    policies. Iran has positioned itself to be fundamentally

    unpredictable -- and having achieved this goal, it concerns the

    United States tremendously.

    Therefore, if the goal of the United States was to create a base

    of operations in Iraq from which to influence the dynamics of the

    region internally, the game is in play even before the war is

    formally ended. The Syrian situation will probably be contained,

    but it represents a fundamentally destabilizing factor to the

    region. The Iranian situation is much more difficult to predict

    in the long run, even as the Iranians practice their

    traditionally complex prudence in the short run.""

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