The Governing Body's Public Denial Of Being Easy On Childmolesters Will Hurt Them Big Time In Court
SPARROWDOWN- That's pretty good girl ! I think you just about covered it ! LOL. Oh yeah, one more thing- WT is a criminal organization. Peace out, Mr. Flipper
The GB/clergy/faithful slave/Guardians of Doctrine/talking heads/JD's psychopath bosses or what ever the hell they actually are.
They wear many hats.
I''m sure JD is right as he seems to have the skinny on all things GB...wonder why that is... oh well.
I'm not so sure, I think he may be taking a very narrow view point that maybe incorrect. As he does not know the inner workings of power with in the Watchtower Corporation which will take someone of higher legal status that JD. Information he is not privy to.
Second, is that in the US a court cannot interpret what a member of the clergy says is right or wrong as long as it is their truly held religious beliefs and that it doesn't promote the breaking of a civil law. Neither of those clips promotes breaking of any civil law and would probably never be admitted.
They are not breaking any civil laws by denial of what the 'worldly' courts are saying about them, but they are lying to their members about a problem they are facing and demonizing any source that brings the truth to it's members about this problem which will hurt them in future lawsuits and be used against them in a court of law in determining damages for victims. I'm sure many a law firm are happy for these clips and will getting a good settlement for their client because of this blatantly evil denial. The Courts will look at them as wolves in sheep's clothing and levy fines appropriately for the crimes of human decency.
Also on top of those two things, courts have consistently ruled that suits against Watchtower should not include punitive damages in most cases. That is what the Conti Case saw and what happened in Vermont just this year
How much did Conti finally get do you know? I think your statements on the Conti case are a little broad which is what the WT corporation does all the time and misleading,, care to give us the exact case and court records?
And what happened in Vermont which one are you referring to?
I'm sure that these statements made by these GB members go against any kind of legal council or their legal department, but because the Governing Body are totally/insanely delusional they disregarded any council and spoke public anyway on these subjects setting themselves up for some massive lawsuits in the process. I mean they really feel they are this Faithful and Discreet Slave thingy and so they can't keep a lid on it.
Of course a really good lawyer can argue to get those tapes in but it is not a guarantee and would be a huge uphill battle. Look at what civil rights lawyers are fighting for to get coments made by President Trump prior to his assuming office, for those comments to be entered into evidence as to his true intentions. I tis not easy.
In Lewis V Watchtower the court ruled:
"In Vermont, the culpability required to support an award of punitive damages based on reckless misconduct requires “evidence that the defendant acted, or failed to act, in conscious and deliberate disregard of a known, substantial, and intolerable risk of harm to the plaintiff, with the knowledge that the acts or omissions were substantially certain to result in the threatened harm.”"
Also the case in Louisana recently was dismissed due to failure to make a claim.
In the Conti case the Appeals court ruled
Because breach of the alleged duty to warn was the sole basis for imposition of punitive damages on Watchtower, we reverse that portion of the judgment, with directions to enter judgment for Watchtower on the punitive damage claim. The compensatory damage award is affirmed.
It does appear that the appeals court would require an overt action by a member of those contrcolled by the master in order to attribute punitive damanges.
Just for example bellow is the law on
Civil Code section 3294 provides, in part:
(a) In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.
(b) An employer shall not be liable for damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.
(c) As used in this section, the following definitions shall apply:
(1) "Malice" means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.
(2) "Oppression" means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.
(3) "Fraud" means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.
"[E]vidence of ratification of [agent's] actions by Hamilton, and any other findings made under Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (b), must be made by clear and convincing evidence." (Barton v. Alexander Hamilton Life Ins. Co. of America (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1640, 1644 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d 258].)
"Subdivision (b) is not a model of clarity, but in light of California's history of employer liability for punitive damages and of the Legislature's reasons for enacting subdivision (b), we have no doubt that it does no more than codify and refine existing law. Subdivision (b) thus authorizes the imposition of punitive damages on an employer in three situations: (1) when an employee was guilty of oppression, fraud or malice, and the employer with advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others, (2) when an employee was guilty of oppression, fraud or malice, and the employer authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct, or (3) when the employer was itself guilty of the oppression, fraud or malice." (Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1151 [74 Cal.Rptr.2d 510].)
" 'California has traditionally allowed punitive damages to be assessed against an employer (or principal) for the acts of an employee (or agent) only where the circumstances indicate that the employer himself was guilty of fraud, oppression, or malice. Thus, even before section 3294, subdivision (b) was added to the Civil Code in 1980, the courts required evidence that the employer authorized or ratified a malicious act, personally committed such an act, or wrongfully hired or retained an unfit employee.' The 'additional' burden on a plaintiff seeking punitive damages from an employer is to show not only that an employee acted with oppression, fraud or malice, but that the employer engaged in conduct defined in subdivision (b)." (Weeks, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at p. 1154, internal citation omitted.)
"Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (b) does not authorize an award of punitive damages against an employer for the employee's wrongful conduct. It authorizes an award of punitive damages against an employer for the employer's own wrongful conduct. Liability under subdivision (b) is vicarious only to the extent that the employer is liable for the actions of its officer, director or managing agent in hiring or controlling the offending employee, in ratifying the offense or in acting with oppression, fraud or malice. It is not vicarious in the sense that the employer is liable for the wrongful conduct of the offending employee." (Weeks, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1154-1155.)
"We have instructed courts to determine the reprehensibility of a defendant by considering whether: the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident. The existence of any one of these factors weighing in favor of a plaintiff may not be sufficient to sustain a punitive damages award; and the absence of all of them renders any award suspect." (State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., supra, 538 U.S. at p. 419, internal citation omitted.)
"An award of punitive damages is not supported by a verdict based on breach of contract, even where the defendant's conduct in breaching the contract was wilful, fraudulent, or malicious. Even in those cases in which a separate tort action is alleged, if there is 'but one verdict based upon contract' a punitive damage award is improper." (Myers Building Industries, Ltd. v. Interface Technology, Inc. (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 949, 960 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 242], internal citations omitted.)
"[P]unitive damages are not assessed against employers on a pure respondeat superior basis. Some evidence of fault by the employer itself is also required." (College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 724, fn. 11 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 898, 882 P.2d 894].)
"Subdivision (b) . . . governs awards of punitive damages against employers, and permits an award for the conduct described there without an additional finding that the employer engaged in oppression, fraud or malice." (Weeks, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at p. 1137.)
"Section 3294 is no longer silent on who may be responsible for imputing punitive damages to a corporate employer. For corporate punitive damages liability, section 3294, subdivision (b), requires that the wrongful act giving rise to the exemplary damages be committed by an 'officer, director, or managing agent.' " (White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 572 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 19, 981 P.2d 944].)
"[I]n performing, ratifying, or approving the malicious conduct, the agent must be acting as the organization's representative, not in some other capacity." (College Hospital, Inc., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 723.)
"[T]he concept [of managing agent] assumes that such individual was acting in a corporate or employment capacity when the conduct giving rise to the punitive damages claim against the employer occurred." (College Hospital, Inc., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 723.)
"No purpose would be served by punishing the employer for an employee's conduct that is wholly unrelated to its business or to the employee's duties therein." (College Hospital, Inc., supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 723-724.)
" 'The determination whether employees act in a managerial capacity [i.e., are managing agents] does not necessarily hinge on their "level" in the corporate hierarchy. Rather, the critical inquiry is the degree of discretion the employees possess in making decisions that will ultimately determine corporate policy.' " (Kelly-Zurian v. Wohl Shoe Co., Inc. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 397, 421 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 457], internal citation omitted.)
"[W]e conclude the Legislature intended the term 'managing agent' to include only those corporate employees who exercise substantial independent authority and judgment in their corporate decisionmaking so that their decisions ultimately determine corporate policy. The scope of a corporate employee's discretion and authority under our test is therefore a question of fact for decision on a case-by-case basis." (White, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 566-567.)
"In order to demonstrate that an employee is a true managing agent under section 3294, subdivision (b), a plaintiff seeking punitive damages would have to show that the employee exercised substantial discretionary authority over significant aspects of a corporation's business." (White, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 577.)
" '[C]orporate policy' is the general principles which guide a corporation, or rules intended to be followed consistently over time in corporate operations. A 'managing agent' is one with substantial authority over decisions that set these general principles and rules." (Cruz v. Homebase (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 160, 167-168 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 435].)
" '[R]atification' is the '[c]onfirmation and acceptance of a previous act.' A corporation cannot confirm and accept that which it does not actually know about." (Cruz, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 168.)
"For purposes of determining an employer's liability for punitive damages, ratification generally occurs where, under the particular circumstances, the employer demonstrates an intent to adopt or approve oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious behavior by an employee in the performance of his job duties." (College Hospital, Inc., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 726.)
"Corporate ratification in the punitive damages context requires actual knowledge of the conduct and its outrageous nature." (College Hospital, Inc., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 726.)
You failed to mention some key fact which allowed the courts to rule in WT corporation's favor namely that the molestation happened during a private baby sitting arrangement and not while participating in a congregation sponsored activity.
And logically could not be held liable for what happens in a private matter the corporation had no control over.
completely agree. And just like Mr. Simons has said previously the Conti case was very unique because the abuse took place during a congregation sponsored activity.
Other states along with California talk about how the employer must have approved the action of the employee for it to rise to a punitive damage. How many cases is it that the abuse took place during congregation activity.
Is it right or not? that is up to each person, but this is reality.
True I think were the WT Corporation gets in trouble for the other molesters is the fact that they had knowledge of a person being a molester and let the person have responsibilities that involve children of the congregation and the parents are not warned. and so the molestation happened.
If someone becomes a molester while serving as an elder doesn't make the WT guilty automatically, unless committed offense and the WT covered it up with the two witness rule and allowed further harm come to the members children,, then they can collect damages from the WT for gross negligence for putting them in harms way regardless of where the molestation was committed.
But such as in the Conti case the appeals court ruled that Watchtower has no duty to warn nor a duty to protect. Most courts that have ruled on this have said that Watchtower has no fiduciary responsibility to it's members or to children.
There is a case in California that a pioneer hit someone with their car while the person was leaving service. The court ruled that because the agent was not servicing in a capacity of the master the master cannot be held liable for the agent's action.
Hey did you here of the case of what was called Mr Coffee that used to shout at bethlites and that a brother accidentally hit him backing up or something with the WT owned van. I think he got a couple of hundred thousand or something?
I remember hearing about him in the early 80s. This was in Brooklyn.
yup i heard of him. but the reason why he was able to sue watchtower was because the Betheliete was doing his job at the time. I don't know any elder whose job it is to hurt children. Again is it right, that is up to each person. But this is the law.