Consider this perspective, though admittedly, it is a black swan type of scenario.
There's reason for optimism on Arab-Israeli peace - Michael Cohen: On Politics, Domestic And Foreign
theguardian.com, Sunday 19 January 2014 08.00 EST
It's quite possible that of all the people writing about the Arab-Israeli conflict these days, I'm the
only one with any confidence that the current peace talks will lead to a positive outcome.
Generally, betting on a Middle East peace deal is the political equivalent of playing Three Card
Monte. It's impossible to win. But, at the same time, there are real reasons for optimism about
where this process might lead. In fact, Israelis and Palestinians may be closer to peace today than
any point in the past 65 years.
This is, in part, the result of a number of historical currents that have come together at this
moment. Israelis continue to remain generally supportive of a two-state solution; the Palestinians,
while less supportive, have seen their political leverage slowly dissipate; and perhaps above all,
the rejectionists on both sides but particularly on the Palestinian side (and I'm speaking here of
Hamas) are in an unusually weak position.
But historical currents by themselves are not determinative. There is also the role of personality
and contingency. Enter John Kerry.
When Kerry began his quixotic pursuit of a comprehensive peace deal, many were skeptical. But
even the doubters gave begrudging hosannas to the approach he had taken. Unlike the flawed
Oslo process, Kerry insisted that this round of peace talks aim towards the achievement of a final
settlement on all outstanding issues. Even more importantly, he brought the neighboring Arab
states into the mix by incorporating the Arab Peace Initiative, which calls for full recognition of
Israel in return for acceptance of a Palestinian state. This had the effect of both giving Israel a
major sweetener for a deal but also offered the prospect of marginalizing Hamas even further by
drying up their support in the Arab world. It was a strong starting point.
Since then Kerry has kept up the pressure and created a negotiation structure that left both sides
(but particularly the Israelis) with little choice to move forward or be blamed for any breakdown
in talks. Case in point, earlier this month Kerry traveled to the region in order to get sign off from
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Abbas on a framework agreement that would
serve as the template for future negotiation. While the framework represents a rough set of
principles, it will likely establish certain baseline ideas, like a Palestinian state oriented around
the 1967 lines, that are anathema to the Israeli right-wing. As a State Department official said to
me, "We strongly believe that the framework would be significant breakthrough in the process as
we move toward a final status agreement/peace treaty."
This will likely leave a clear set of options for Bibi: sign the framework agreement and set Israel
on the path to peace or don't and risk a break with the United States or worse (more on this in a
second). Of course, much will depend on how decisively the framework agreement lays out the
clear outlines of a final deal – and the extent to which it forces Netanyahu to adopt positions that
he and his right-wing supporters have long rejected. But Netanyahu has bobbed and weaved his
way during these negotiations and has refused to make conclusive moves in the direction of
peace. Kerry is making it increasingly difficult for him to continue that charade.
The US secretary of state, however, is not alone in tightening the vise on Netanyahu. The
Palestinians are playing their part as well – though, truth be told, more out of a position of
weakness than strength. Considering the inclination of the Palestinian political leadership to, in
the depressingly accurate words of former Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban, never miss an
opportunity, it is quite possible (and many have speculated) that Bibi's approach to Kerry's
gambit was to hope the Palestinian leadership would blow things up.
But with the head of Palestinian Authority Mahmoud Abbas as supportive of a two-state solution
as any Palestinian leader ever; with Hamas in a historically weak position and with Palestinians
having largely turned their back on violence as a political tool the Palestinian leadership have
stuck along with Kerry's diplomacy even they are almost certain to get something less than a
good deal. Try as hard as he might to conjure examples of Palestinian duplicity, Netanyahu has
failed, putting him and Israel in the uncomfortable position that if the talks don't move forward, it
is Israel that will likely shoulder the blame – a fact not lost on the Israeli Prime Minister.
This matters more than it did in the past because it is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore
the growing signs of Israel's international isolation. For those not getting the hint, the message
from Europe and, in particular, the European Union has been fairly clear. Over the past several
weeks there have been repeated examples of European countries and companies putting Israel on
notice. There were the guidelines put forward by the European Union last August banning EU
grants or loans to Israeli companies doing business in the West Bank. Last month, a Dutch water
company ended its business relationship with an Israeli firm that operates in the occupied
territories and the UK Trade & Investment, a business promotion book, warned companies about
the "reputational implications" of collaborating with Israeli settlements.
Yet at the same time the EU has said that a deal with the Palestinians would open up a floodgate
of new investment and closer economic ties with the Jewish state. The Europeans have used both
the carrot and stick with Israel – and made abundantly clear what will be the consequences of
failure.
Finally, there is the pressure coming from inside Netanyahu's own government. Over the past
several weeks, two of Bibi's more prominent coalition members – Tzipi Livni, who is helming
the peace talks and Yair Lapid, who helms the second largest voting bloc in the Israeli Knesset,
have hinted that they expect the peace process to move forward … or else. Livni's departure
would not be a major problem for Bibi, but Lapid leaving would be something else altogether. It
would force Netanyahu to create a new coalition in the Israeli Knesset – one composed almost
exclusively of far right and religious parties.
Bibi could, of course, choose to go down that road or he could move forward with negotiations,
sign the framework agreement and hope that an exit ramp somehow materializes along the way.
In short, he could do what the recently deceased Ariel Sharon would never do – let others dictate
decisions about Israel's future.
To some extent, however, the train has already left the station. Anything less than a deal in these
talks – no matter who is blamed for their collapse – will almost certainly lead to a very dark
future for Israel. No longer will a nation that rules over millions of Palestinian Arab, and denies
the majority of them full political rights, be able to label itself the Middle East's only true
democracy. Relations with the United States (particularly with the Obama Administration) will
inevitably suffer. How much? No one can say for sure, but that uncertainly alone should concern
Israelis.
The harsh criticism last week of Kerry by Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon – and the
tough US reaction to it – offers one potential preview. Finally, the international sanctions and
boycott effort will only gather steam; as too will Israel's growing international isolation.
For Netanyahu, the choice to make peace and give up the West Bank is increasingly the only
good option he has left. The question now is whether Bibi realizes that the game is up or whether
he fully appreciates the consequences of failure. The argument for optimism on the peace process
is that never before have the historical forces been so well-aligned for the achievement of a final
deal.
State Department officials speak to the "courageous decisions" taken on both sides to date:
namely Netanyahu's agreement to release Palestinian prisoners and Abbas's assent to put off
efforts to "upgrade the status of the Palestinians in international organizations". But, of course,
far more difficult steps will need to be made to reach a deal that is acceptable to all sides.
Ultimately, any breakthrough will come down to political leaders willing to make a decisive
break with the past. We're not there yet.
