Hi Ladonna,
:Hi Duns,
I have an idea where you are coming from.
Kripkes' style is "essentialism" whereby he seeks to explain essence in terms of essential properties.
You have me thinking back a fair few years, but can these questions be adequately explained on logical grounds when by the same token they cannot be explained on metaphysical grounds either?:
Admittedly, Kripke's "essentialism" has been hotly contested by other philosophers of language. Of course, before we are too critical, we must read his statements of fact about water and heat in the light of his entire rigid designation project. Simply put, Kripke wants to say that the proposition, "this table is not made of ice," if true, is true in all counterfactual situations. Thus he posits a type of metaphysical necessity vis-à-vis such propositions as the foregoing statement about "this table" as well as propositions like "water is H20."
Ultimately, Kripke is trying to overthrow Russell's description theory that contends the moniker, Aristotle, in the proposition, "Aristotle was the last great philosopher of antiquity" is not a rigid designator: It is a description, claims Russell. That is, in a counterfactual situation, Russell thinks that there could have been someone else who was "the last great philosopher of antiquity," who was not Aristotle (according to Russell). Kripke seems to disagree. The same principle extended to the name, Aristotle, applies to water and heat. If we encounter a substance that is 1 part oxygen and 2 parts hydrogen, then it has to be water, says Kripke. Water is a rigid designation that is true in all possible worlds.
Granted, we cannot apodictically prove Kripke's position. But I think it opens up theoretical possibilities concerning the likelihood of God's necessary existence. Paul Davies, the astrophysicist, once wrote that the proposition, "God does not exist," while it does not violate any logical schema--could be false in all possible worlds. In other words, the word "God" might be a rigid designator, and the proposition, "God exists," could be true in all counterfactual situations. Yet this statement of fact might be unprovable on the basis of Godel's incompleteness theorem.
Thanks for your input,
Dan
Duns the Scot