by Elsewhere 22 Replies latest social current
For a long time al-Zarqawi was in the news regarding a string of major terrorist attacks in Iraq... the US even put a $25 Million dollar reward on his head.
For the last month or so I have not heard peep about him. Was he killed or captured and I did not see it in the news?
Also, is it just me or has Iraq been unusually calm for some time now... except for the al Sadar fuss in Najaf... which in comparison to past events has been very calm.
Iraq calm??
Power and Interest News Report (PINR)
http://www.pinr.com
[email protected]
------------------------------
August 11, 2004:
To see a past analysis from January explaining the side effects that
would be caused by a separation of Iraq, visit the following analysis:
''Division of Iraq Would Likely Breed Regional Instability''
http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=140
------------------------------
''Iraq's Slide Toward Separation''
Drafted by Dr. Michael A. Weinstein on August 11, 2004
http://www.pinr.com
Recent events and persisting conditions in Iraq have lowered the
probability that the country will become a strong centralized nation-state
after its transition.
The United States has abandoned any serious attempts to transform Iraq
into a market democracy. Having withdrawn to a posture of force
protection, back-up support for local forces and concentration on rooting out
international Islamic revolutionaries, Washington has little
street-level influence on the shaping of Iraqi political forces. Those forces are
moving rapidly in the opposite direction from American plans and
interests.
The direction that Iraq's transition is currently taking is toward the
destination that the former Yugoslavia reached when it split into
mini-states based on ethnicity. In both cases, the fall of a one-party
socialist dictatorship that had imposed a coercive unity on a diverse
society has led to people taking shelter in sub-national ethnic groups. In
Yugoslavia, the contending groups became increasingly jealous of their
perceived interests and unwilling to compromise them. In Iraq today, the
same pattern is emerging, as the major ethnic groups become more
insular.
- Contenders for Power
Iraq is currently a contested space with no unifying political formula
to focus a common identity. The three major contenders for power -- the
Shi'a Arabs, Sunni Arabs and Sunni Kurds -- have embraced overall
strategies that lead them toward confrontation. Shi'a Arabs seek to dominate
a single Iraqi state; Sunni Arabs seek to recover the dominance that
they once had or at least parity with the Shi'a; Kurds seek to retain the
autonomy -- amounting to independence -- that they had before the
occupation, and extend their rule to oil-rich regions with large Kurdish
populations that were outside their protected zone. Shi'a aims are opposed
by Sunni Arabs and Kurds; Kurdish aims are opposed by Sunni and Shi'a
Arabs; Sunni aims are opposed by Shi'a Arabs and Kurds.
With approximately 60 percent of the population, the Shi'a have mainly
fallen into line with the strategy of their major spiritual leader
Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani of waiting for the results of free elections
before they use extra-legal means to pursue their interests; if
elections yield Shi'a dominance, then their aims will be met without resort to
force. Similarly, the Kurds are waiting to see how they fare in the
constitutional structure of the new Iraq before they turn their militia to
defensive warfare. Segments of the Sunni Arab community are already
engaged in military insurgency, having the lowest expectations that the
transition will benefit them. There is little room in this scenario for
alliances between the major groups or for cross-ethnic alliances among
factions within them. At most, there will be shifting coalitions of
convenience, as the groups thrust and parry, and leaders vie for supremacy
within them.
- Weakness of Forces Mitigating Conflict
Many analysts and commentators argue that understanding Iraqi politics
through the perceived interests of its major ethnic groups
oversimplifies the actual situation. They are correct that Iraq is a diverse and
complex society with a panoply of political tensions, but they miss the
point that the occupation has brought a hardening of group identities
that dissolves other allegiances, partly because of the communal
representation system imposed by the occupation authority that carried over to
the transitional government, and partly because insecurity drives
people under the protective cover of their ethnic groups. It would be a
mistake to believe that the basic ethnic divide was not the formative
structure of Iraqi society before the occupation -- the deep fissures that
had been barely covered by dictatorship have simply become wider.
The intensification of rivalries between Iraq's three major ethnic
groups diminishes the mitigating effects of cross-cutting interests and
loyalties. There is a genuine Iraqi nationalism, but it was concentrated
in the Sunni Arab middle class of experts and apparatchiks, which has
now been displaced and tends more and more to be driven by
de-Ba'athification, unemployment and fears of persecution into narrow group loyalty.
The Kurds were never Iraqi nationalists and the Shi'a are divided, with
sub-national affiliation dominant in the lower classes and loosening in
the middle class. Having suffered persecution and discrimination at the
hands of Sunni Arab elites under the monarchy and the Ba'athist regime,
Shi'a Arabs and Kurds never developed as strong an Iraqi identity as
did the Sunni Arabs.
Similarly, secularism is rooted in the urban middle classes of all the
groups, especially the Sunni Arabs, and sectors of the working class in
the oil industry. For the Kurds, sub-nationalism overrides any
commitment to secularism that would forge bonds across ethnic lines. The
secularist strata of the Shi'a Arabs have not been able to gain a popular
following -- the effective leadership of the Shi'a community is clerical.
The Sunni Arabs are split between secular sub-nationalism and a growing
religious identification based on clerical power.
The diminished power of nationalist, secular and even moderate
religious forces leaves each group with a more rigid definition of identity
fusing religion with language for Shi'a and Sunni Arabs, and intensifying
linguistic and cultural identity for the Kurds. The stage is set for
the kinds of aggressive intolerance that marked the breakup of
Yugoslavia.
- Emerging Insular Tendencies
The most important indicator of a tendency toward group insularity in
Iraq is the appearance of movements with wide support among Shi'a and
Sunni Arabs that are based upon rejection of the occupation and the
transitional government. Both Moqtada al-Sadr's rise to legitimacy in the
Shi'a community after leading a rebellion against the occupation and
Sheikh Hareth al-Dhari's rise to legitimacy in the Sunni Arab community
through his Association of Islamic Scholars make similar forms of Islamism
permanent and significant components of Iraqi politics that are above
ground. Al-Sadr's and al-Dhari's movements pull their respective
communities towards confrontational stands against the other groups and make
it more politically risky for more moderate factions to compromise
across ethnic lines.
Cities in the Shi'a heartland and the Sunni Triangle are now under
partial control of the insular Islamists, giving them a foothold to
influence the direction of the transition. The alternatives to the Islamists
are the exile parties that have collaborated with the occupation and
hold positions in the transitional government. The collaborators are
currently on the defensive, seeking to hold on to power, but are
increasingly pushed to compromise with the hardliners. No significant movements
comprised of people who stayed in Iraq under Saddam's regime and are
disposed to compromise have emerged. Those who do not affiliate with the
exile parties and have not gone over to Islamism seek protection in
tribal networks that have no national scope.
A symptom of the inability to achieve political coherence on a national
level in Iraq is the delay of a conference to choose a National Council
to function as a quasi-legislative authority during the transition.
Scheduled for July 30, the conference has been moved to August 15 under
pressure from United Nations representative Lakhtar Brahimi on the
grounds that it was not sufficiently representative of Iraqi political forces
outside the transitional government. Complaints about the selection
process were rampant in the Shi'a and Sunni Arab communities. Some
factions seeking representation were excluded or not informed of the
conference, and others refused to participate. Most telling was the withdrawal
from the process of the major Sunni Arab party collaborating in the
transition -- the Islamic Party -- on the grounds that the conference could
not be legitimate in the context of the occupation.
That a conference can gain legitimacy or even be held after renewed
efforts by Brahimi to augment participation remains in doubt. Indeed,
whether general elections will take place as scheduled in January 2005 is
problematic. The failure to hold the conference on time has revealed the
incoherence of the Iraqi political situation -- the lack of interests
in unity with sufficient power to mobilize even the most rudimentary
consensus. That failure has also shown the weakness of transitional Prime
Minister Iyad Allawi as a presumptive strongman. Given Allawi's limited
resources, the divisions among competing groups and factions within
groups are too deep and manifold for him to be able to bridge them with
deals or suppress them through mobilizing popular support. The prospects
that Allawi will become Iraq's Mubarak have diminished considerably,
and there is no one waiting in the wings to replace him as a national
figure.
If a centralized result for Iraq's transition is becoming less
probable, the alternatives are a weak federation or a breakup into three
mini-states. Separatist sentiment among the Shi'a was manifest at a
mini-congress held in Basra at the end of July that recommended the creation of
a "south province" with broad local powers under a decentralized Iraqi
federation, essentially following the Kurdish paradigm. Adel al-Abadi,
an organizer of the mini-congress, claimed that its call for autonomy
was endorsed by al-Sistani. The Shi'a are already mapping out a
contingency plan if they fail to dominate Iraq as a whole.
- Conclusion
Behind the recent developments that cast doubts on a centralized future
for Iraq is the eruption of permanently organized insular tendencies
within the Shi'a and Sunni Arab communities, and the persistence of such
tendencies among the Kurds who continue to exert pressure on Arabs --
mostly Shi'a -- who had migrated to the north under Saddam Hussein's
"Arabization" program. As outside powers remain unwilling and unable to
impose centralization, Iraq slides toward eventual separation, preceded
by intensified insurgency and, perhaps, civil war.
- The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an analysis-based
publication that seeks to, as objectively as possible, provide insight into
various conflicts, regions and points of interest around the globe. PINR
approaches a subject based upon the powers and interests involved,
leaving the moral judgments to the reader. This report may not be
reproduced, reprinted or broadcast without the written permission of
[email protected]. All comments should be directed to
[email protected].
More liberal,left wishful ruminating. So transparent
He usually spends summers in Monserat. I'm sure he'll be back blowing up things with renewed vigor in a few short weeks.
Take care, and thanks for asking,
Zarqawi's liberal love-child,
Six
How can we be sure he was not an invention of the news media? I think there is more than just al-Zarqawi causing problems in Iraq. Also I wouldn't be surprised if there is a terrorist attack planned for the Olympic games. I am surprised it has been fairly quiet so far, with no major inccidents. Terrorists will hit when we least expect them to, the calm before the storm.
Will
I'd hardly describe it as calm ... it just seems that it's no longer news. The usual attention deficit disorder seems to be starting ...
I'm sure he'll conveniently turn up captured nearer the election or else 'appear' in the next place America wants to bomb. Ooh, how did I get so cynical?!
Simon:
"...in the next place America wants to bomb. Ooh, how did I get so cynical?!"
* sigh * I really wish you would get specific...when you make 'country emcompassing' posts like those, you make it sound as though there was a popular vote on bomb dropping. You are causing trouble for yourself and this fine board for reasons that are not clear at all.
I don't care what you say about Bush, I really don't. I do care when you blame a whole country.
When Simon is referring to where America is bombing I don't think he is refering to all the American people but your present administration. As that is not what I got out of his comment. You are correct maybe he should have stated it another way i.e. "where is Bush going to bomb next".
I have to agree with another poster on here when he said that Bush and company would like to start more wars but are only waiting till after the election to do it. I am not a big fan of Kerry's either as he has not come right out and condemed the war but hopefully he will clean house and get rid of Rumsfeld, PearI, Wolfiwitch and company and don't start any new wars.
Will
I'm the poster that mentioned that yes, Bush is simply waiting out the election before moving on to Iran. We're already seeing the pieces being set in motion. Iran isn't helping itself out by issuing threats of its own. But clearly once Bush is guaranteed another 4 years, he's going to get busy with the work that's left to be done. By simply invading Iran, he gets to knock out Syria and Egypt all in one punch, since they won't stand by. Personally, I don't think he's interested in taking on N.Korea. But rather, it's mostly a Middle East game, because that's where the business interests of the Bush and Saudi families are vested.
I think taking out Iran is pretty good idea. It would've been the smart place to have started all this stuff. But after the Iraq debacle, it's a dumb idea. Iran shouldn't have nukes, I agree with that. But if Bush is going to invade Iran to make a democracy, then he should also invade Saudi Arabia, which he won't, because we all now know that it was never his intention to remake the middle east SIMPLY for the sake of democracy. But rather, it's a combination of strategic oil supply and ambition mixed with it. Blood and oil mixed with the Saudis and the Bush's living happily ever after.
Here's how it should've happened. If you're going to be a war president, you can't fuck up such a simple formula.
Invade Afghanistan and thoroughly defeat the Taliban and Al-Quaeda. (I still think this was a smart thing to do, they should've finished it)
Give the Palestinians the West Bank, at least some of it and allow them self rule. (A very good idea, one way to get some warm-fuzzys from the arabs)
Invade Saudi Arabia or force it to become a democracy. (This is a must to be taken seriously by the arabs)
Invade Iran and fight Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt with it. Remake all of them democracies. (This is a lot like making your kid drink chicken broth, not fun but good for them)
Mission Accomplished.
Now you can move on to an isolated N.Korea. And when you're done with them, China...
Didn't Bush ever play Risk as a kid? He should know this...
Dolphman
America would get it's ass kicked it it tried to do even half of all that.
The current action in Afghanistan and Iraq, two hardly well-prepared or well-armed nations have bogged the mighty USA military down and shown them to have feet of clay, possibly encouraging other nations to fancy their chances. They have been stretched ... badly.
What you need to be doing is TALKING and building alliances, not building up more countries to oppose you.
In short: Stop with the silly posturing and bully-boy playground tactics.
"Mission accomplished" ... my arse !!
