BTS, it is ofcourse a tautology that if there are reasons why not preventing a rape is the moral thing to do, then not preventing the rape is the moral thing to do.
However none of the two of us (i think) can really think of any reasons that does not strongly rely on special pleading, in the sence none of us would use them ourselves or accept if a bystander attempted to justify his inactions through them. For instance: (read tammys post if you think this is a hopeless atheist making things up):
- What other sins should i try to prevent? I cannot deside on this question, therefore i will allow this rape to happend.
- All sins are equally bad, and since i (for some reason) do not prevent lies, i will also not prevent this rape
- To me, all are sinners. Therefore i will not prevent this rape.
- I am eventually going to do something about it, therefore i will not prevent this rape right now.
- If i prevent this rape, he might rape again, or other will rape, and nothing will change. Therefore i will not prevent this rape.
As hallquist remark, god may have reasons, and the above reasons may make perfect sence to me if i am God (but i truly hope they would not...). The relevant question to ask is how plausible we think it is that the above reasons hold water, and how reasonable we think it is to dismis Gods inactions by referring to (unknown) reasons, especially in the light of how strongly we would think of a human who also took no action in the rape-situation.