Obviously I am not surprised that someone who is not deeply religious can be interested religion because it is the position I find myself in.
I am sure that my interest, like yours, was kindled in a similar cauldron of experiential background.
There is of course a world of difference between saying "I have no personal views" and being a non-religious agnostic.
Indeed, but I think you miss some of the subtlety of what I have said thus far. When I said "I have no personal views," I added an important qualifier: "I have no personal views of my own, if you are asking about any ontological reality". Yes, I do have an agnostic philosophical outlook, which makes my stance socially-situated and subjective, and I have been explicit about that in talking about what my "beliefs" per se are, e.g. my imperfect but self-correcting understandings of the historical past. From a critical realist position, I feel that it is possible to construct for myself "beliefs" about what more accurately (or, conversely, less accurately) characterizes the history of ideas, but I do not engage in this same process as it pertains to any ontological truth value lying behind these same ideas. That is to say, I do not hold any one of these religious ideas as a belief of my own which I view as probably representing some external truth. I do not have any access to objective knowledge or subjective experience that would lead me to judge between the potentially infinite gamut of positive claims; I feel that considerations of parsimony, induction, and so forth are what lead me closer to "No" than "Yes", but I regard both as positive claims that I cannot adopt as my own. Taking strong atheism as a personally-held belief of external reality is just as much foreign to my thinking as adopting any particularistic theistic model.
I therefore also find this statement problematic: "Being agnostic means that I do not claim any particular view as my own". Because being agnostic is to take a particular view.
Correct, but my point is: a view of what? If you read that statement in its proper context, I was talking about a particular kind of view, namely, those views that make positive claims about an external reality of the divine. A philosophical position on whether one can make such claims is distinct in that respect.
I would also dispute the idea that someone who is agnostic therefore "has no personal stake in the matter". If we have an interest in something then we have a stake in it by definition.
I agree. However you missed my qualification again. I took pains not to imply that I didn't have a stake by adding in parentheses that I was talking about having a stake "that one particular faith corresponds closest to a 'truth' ".
Oh dear. Agnosticism does not involve the absence of an interpretive lens.
Again, you mistake what I am saying. I absolutely was not saying that I do not have an interpretive lens. In fact, I implied almost the opposite -- that if there happens to be an external reality that I one day experience subjectively, I hope my exposure to a wide set of interpretive lenses would give me a richer grasp of my experience than if I had only one lens (such as what I would have if I had remained a committed JW and accepted only that view as having any possibility of representing truth).