I recently read a interesting paper in the Behavioral and Brain Sciences journal entitled, The evolution and psychology of self-deception. In it (section 5 particularly) it talks about what the researchers claim to be varieties of self-deception (note that the linked paper has peer review responses as well that suggest that there might be some misclassification to what is considered to be "self-deception" * ):
- Biased Information Searching
- Amount of Searching
- Selective Searching
- Selective Attention
- Biased Interpretation
- Misremembering
- Rationalization
- Convincing the self that a lie is true
- Self-Deception accompanied/unaccompanied by neurological damage
Of the categories above, I found Biased Information Searching and Biased Interpretation to be the most interesting. Here are some excerpts from the article:
Amount of Searching:
Perhaps the clearest examples [of biased information search] can be found in research by Ditto and colleagues (e.g., Ditto & Lopez 1992; Ditto et al. 2003), in which people are confronted with the possibility that they might have a proclivity for a pancreatic disorder. In these studies people expose a test strip to their saliva and are then led to believe that color change is an indicator of either a positive or negative health prognosis. Ditto and Lopez (1992) found that when people are led to believe that color change is a good thing, they wait more than 60% longer for the test strip to change color than when they believe color change is a bad thing. Studies such as these suggest that information search can be biased in the amount of information gathered even when people are unsure what they will encounter next (see also Josephs et al. 1992). Thus, it appears that people sometimes do not tell themselves the whole truth if a partial truth appears likely to be preferable.
Selective Attention:
Although measures such as reading time provide a good indicator of the amount of information processing, attention can be assessed more directly. Eye-tracking studies provide some of the clearest evidence of where people direct their attention, and such studies have also shown that people are often strategic in their attentional decisions (Isaacowitz 2006). For example, older adults look toward positive stimuli and away from negative stimuli when in a bad mood (Isaacowitz et al. 2008). This attentional bias clearly implicates potential awareness, as some encoding of the negative must take place for preferential attention to be directed toward the positive. This effect did not emerge among younger adults, suggesting that older adults aremore likely than younger adults to rely on selective attention for mood repair. In a case such as this, it appears that older adults sacrifice informational content in service of emotional goals. This strategy might be sensible for older adults who have greater immune challenge than their younger counterparts and thus reap greater benefits from maintaining happiness (see sect. 6). As with the strategy of ending information search early, selective attention can allow people to avoid telling themselves the whole truth.
Biased Interpretation:
Despite the strategies just described for avoiding unwelcome information, there remain a variety of circumstances in which such information is nevertheless faithfully encoded. Under such circumstances, unwelcome information can still be dismissed through biased interpretation of attitude- consistent and attitude-inconsistent information. In the classic study of this phenomenon (Lord et al. 1979), people who were preselected for their strong attitudes on both sides of the capital punishment debate were exposed to a mixed bag of information about the efficacy of capital punishment. For example, some of the data with which they were presented suggested that capital punishment was an effective crime deterrent, whereas other data suggested that it was not. Given that the findings were new to participants, logic would suggest that they would coalesce at least to some degree in their attitudes. In contrast, people ended the experiment more polarized than they began it.
Lord et al. (1979) discovered that this attitude polarization was a product of biased interpretation of the data. People who were in favor of capital punishment tended to accept the data as sound that supported capital punishment but reject the data as flawed that opposed capital punishment. Those who were against capital punishment showed the opposite pattern (see also Dawson et al. 2002). This selective skepticism appears to be self-deceptive, as it is attenuated or eliminated by self-affirmation (Cohen et al. 2000; Reed & Aspinwall 1998) and cognitive load (Ditto et al. 1998). These findings suggest that people have potential awareness of an unbiased appraisal, given that they appear to be relying on their motivational and mental resources to be differentially skeptical. Thus, selective skepticism appears to be a form of self-deception rather than simply an objective devaluation of new information to the degree that it is inconsistent with a large body of prior experience (see also, Westen et al. 2006).
As a consequence of this selective skepticism, peoe are able to encounter a mixed bag of evidence but nevertheless walk away with their original beliefs intact and potentially even strengthened. Because they are unaware that a person with a contrary position would show the opposite pattern of acceptance and rejection, they are able to convince themselves that the data support their viewpoint. Thus, it seems that by relying on their considerable powers of skepticism only when information is uncongenial, people are able to prevent themselves from learning the whole truth.
Reading this made me think a lot about how as a JW I may have been self-deceiving, I thought about how many probably are still self-deceiving, and then also considering how even today, I still may be self-deceiving. It's probably very difficult to avoid. I wanted to share this with everyone here because I think it is very interesting to consider the psychology that might be involved with believing the way JWs believe, especially any sentiment that involves not doing independent research (or reading information presented by former members) for fear of what they might find. This sentiment to me bears much resemblance to the aphorism, "What I don’t know can’t hurt me," which is referenced in the article as well.
In short we self-deceive when we avoid telling ourselves the whole truth, when we avoid unwanted information.
*The peer review commentary that disagrees argues that a distinction exists between self-deception and things that shouldn't be considered "deception". For example is it Self-Deception? Or Self-Bias? Or Self-Persuasion? Or Wishful Thinking? Or Just not caring about the truth? All of these are argued to be different, even subtly, from out right self-deception where the deceiver is also the deceived (i.e. wishful thinking does not entail anyone trying to deceive, so one cannot be a deceiver and deceived; self-bias is acting a way that is selectively biasing and misinforming compared to self deception which is keeping uninformed about unwanted information).