Formal Introduction to Dooyeweerd

by dunsscot 2 Replies latest jw friends

  • dunsscot
    dunsscot

    As part of saying farewell, I want to submit a paper I am in the process of writing that deals with the Dutch Calvinist philosopher Herman Dooyeweerd. Please enjoy and prosper!
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    Dooyeweerd on Leibniz

    In order to understand Dooyeweerd’s treatment of Gottfried Leibniz, we must first review the fifteen Dooyeweerdian modal spheres and discuss the role that they play in his system of thought. Therefore, this essay will first present a brief review of Dooyeweerd’s modalities and then it will discuss his critique of Leibnizian monadological thought.

    According to Dooyeweerd, there are evidently fifteen modal spheres or aspects of reality. These “universal modalities of temporal being” are “different modes of the universal ‘how’ which determine the aspects of our theoretical view of reality” (Dooyeweerd 1:3). That is, the fifteen temporal aspects are indissolubly interrelated and one sphere should not be deified to the detriment of the other spheres. As Dooyeweerd notes: “In this inter-modal cosmic coherence no single aspect stands by itself; every-one refers within and beyond itself to all others” (1:3).

    While scholars debate the exact nature or makeup of Dooyeweerd’s list of modalities, it appears that we can safely delineate the approximately fifteen modal spheres thusly: the quantitative, spatial, kinematic, physical, biotic, sensitive, analytical, formative, lingual, social, economic, aesthetic, juridical, ethical, and pistic. Knowing these spheres and their respective place in the modal hierarchy is a conditio sine qua non for grasping Dooyeweerd’s critique of Leibniz’ thought.

    Dooyeweerd contends that the aspects are neither absolute nor reducible to one another. Therefore, a sphere should not be improperly elevated, absolutized or deified. If one sphere or modalitiy is elevated above another modal aspect, inevitable antinomies (essential paradoxes) and harm necessarily result. Leibniz’ mistake was to elevate or absolutize the quantitative sphere or the mathematical science-ideal. Dooyeweerd makes this point throughout his discussion of Leibniz.

    For instance, he notes that Leibniz holds sin to be a privation of mathematical clarity and distinctness (1:227). Why, God even rules “by the grace of metaphysical-mathematical thought,” and “the creative will of the deity is bound to the eternal metaphysical verities” of mathematical thought (1:227). Nowhere is this point clearer than in Leibniz’ monadological system.

    For Leibniz, force is the “essential attribute of the bodies in the universe” (Frost 39). In fact, the entire cosmos is composed of units of force called monads (force-atoms). Monads are eternal and indestructible. They are also “windowless” or self-sufficient, thus possessing autarchy (completely subsisting in a self-contained manner). Furthermore, the monads are infinite and spaceless “animated points of force” (Dooyeweerd 1:230). The upshot of this philosophical notion, according to Dooyeweerd, is the reduction of the individual with its “qualitative individuality” to the mathematical science ideal. Therefore, the ideal of personality is now capable of being calculated and is in danger of losing its freedom to the Faustian ground motive that seeks to dominate nature by means of “mathematic thought” (1:232). Choice or free will then becomes a matter of choosing the strongest desire determined by the windowless minute units of force: “Leibniz’ standpoint in the problem of freedom of the will—the stumbling block between the science-ideal and the ideal of personality in Humanistic philosophy—is thereby implicitly determined” (1:238). Any influence the monads have on one another is ultimately caused by the intervention of God--by the Ideas of God (1:237). Consequently, Dooyeweerd indicates that the antinomy between the ideal of personality and quantitative thought are manifestly evident in Leibniz’ system. Personality is thereby brought under the complete domination of the quantitative modal aspect: “This subjugation was accomplished by means of the lex continui, the principle of universal order and coherence in the cosmos” (1:239).
    Another consequence of Leibniz’ absolutization of mathematical thought is seen in his theologia, wherein God is said to be the supreme monad, who has no limitations as actus purus. At first, it seems that Leibniz' deity is a throwback to the god of Aristotle (pure thought thinking itself). There is a difference between the God of Leibniz and the god of Aristotle, however, for Leibniz holds that God is “identical with the final hypostasis of the mathematical-science ideal.” Leibniz’ theism therefore seems to subtly become “logical-mathematical pantheism” (1:234). Dooyeweerd explicitly writes that Leibniz' deity is simply the hypostasis of pure creative thought. Harmony and God are one and in this way, Spinoza’s famed dictum deus sive natura becomes Harmonia universalis, id est Deus” (1:240).

    Duns the Scot

    "Nobody is taller than himself or herself."

  • Stephanus
    Stephanus

    Wait! You can't go yet! You haven't been unmasked (is that the Mystery Machine I hear approaching?)

  • dunsscot
    dunsscot

    I am going to leave BEFORE I git unmasked, mate.

    No worries,
    Dan

    Duns the Scot

    "Nobody is taller than himself or herself."

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