at one time scientists believed that living things and non-living things were made of different material, accounting for the unique properties of living things.
this idea is called vitalism and is no longer popular.
what does remain popular (in fact is still the dominant view) is a similar idea that things that experience the world (humans, frogs, mice) are different from things that don't experience the world (potatoes, rocks, snowflakes).
We can only be sure that living things have consciousness? How can we be sure they have consciousness? Or that nothing else has awareness?
Consciouness necessitates hunger and feeding? Maybe, I don’t know. How can you prove that?
Like I said above, it seems panpsychists like Strawson make a distinction between. consciounesss and awareness. Beetles, flies, and plants may not be conscious, but have different kinds of awareness. Then crystals and atoms different kinds still, who knows?
at one time scientists believed that living things and non-living things were made of different material, accounting for the unique properties of living things.
this idea is called vitalism and is no longer popular.
what does remain popular (in fact is still the dominant view) is a similar idea that things that experience the world (humans, frogs, mice) are different from things that don't experience the world (potatoes, rocks, snowflakes).
I'm not sure the same can be said of crystals or rocks.
I’m not sure either. But the idea is not ridiculous. Is it part of a spectrum, or is there a clear cut off point? Some would place the cut off before trees, or before insects, or some other creatures, for that matter.
The fact is that the only thing we can be absolutely certain about is that we exist. In that sense the experiential precedes the physical. We can be surer that we exist as thinking beings than we can be about the existence of the external world.
The existence of the external world, and its nature as either experiential in character or without awarensss, are matters for speculation.
Plus there’s something a bit troubling about the coherency of materialism taken to its reductionist extreme. Have you ever read Daniel Dennett on consciousness? He argues that consciousness is purely a physical process and consciousness is a sort of illusion. But if we are suffering from an illusion that we exist, then who is suffering the illusion? If we want to talk about nonsensical philosophical positions that would be a better example.
at one time scientists believed that living things and non-living things were made of different material, accounting for the unique properties of living things.
this idea is called vitalism and is no longer popular.
what does remain popular (in fact is still the dominant view) is a similar idea that things that experience the world (humans, frogs, mice) are different from things that don't experience the world (potatoes, rocks, snowflakes).
He funny that you included trees!
at one time scientists believed that living things and non-living things were made of different material, accounting for the unique properties of living things.
this idea is called vitalism and is no longer popular.
what does remain popular (in fact is still the dominant view) is a similar idea that things that experience the world (humans, frogs, mice) are different from things that don't experience the world (potatoes, rocks, snowflakes).
just because some questions can be formulated and stacked in sequence does not bestow merit to most of them.
Well indeed. What I am asking is if there is any logical or empirical reason for assuming matter is unaware, rather than the opposite. Not assuming that any particular stance has merit merely because it can be formulated into a statement or a question.
Simply asserting that matter is unaware and that any other view is ridiculous is not an argument. It involves neither logic nor evidence. It's simply an appeal to tradition or bias, and an exercise in rhetoric.
at one time scientists believed that living things and non-living things were made of different material, accounting for the unique properties of living things.
this idea is called vitalism and is no longer popular.
what does remain popular (in fact is still the dominant view) is a similar idea that things that experience the world (humans, frogs, mice) are different from things that don't experience the world (potatoes, rocks, snowflakes).
jp
a materialist asks: how can you know that matter is aware?
a panpsychist asks: how can you know that matter is unaware?
You seem to think the first question is reasonable but the second question is not. Which is your privilege. But my question is why you think the first question has any more merit than the second one? Materialism may be ascendant and have tradition and popularity on its side. But is there any actual logical or empirical reason to priorotise the first question over the second?
at one time scientists believed that living things and non-living things were made of different material, accounting for the unique properties of living things.
this idea is called vitalism and is no longer popular.
what does remain popular (in fact is still the dominant view) is a similar idea that things that experience the world (humans, frogs, mice) are different from things that don't experience the world (potatoes, rocks, snowflakes).
That is like asking what colour is love?
Not really, because love doesn't have a colour, but a crystal has existence.
You assume it's a stupid question because you assume that non-living matter has no awareness. But that's the very thing under discussion. What is the basis for the assumption that most things are unaware?
Sam Harris didn't seem to think it was a stupid question. Did you listen to his discussion?
at one time scientists believed that living things and non-living things were made of different material, accounting for the unique properties of living things.
this idea is called vitalism and is no longer popular.
what does remain popular (in fact is still the dominant view) is a similar idea that things that experience the world (humans, frogs, mice) are different from things that don't experience the world (potatoes, rocks, snowflakes).
Thomas Nagel's approach to the issue, as I understand it, is widely regarded among analytic philosophers, and used as the basis for discussion in the philosophy of mind.
Notice that the point is not the specific answer to the question; "what is it like to be a bat?" The point is that if there is an answer to the question (even though we don't know what the answer is) then we are dealing with some sort of awareness.
at one time scientists believed that living things and non-living things were made of different material, accounting for the unique properties of living things.
this idea is called vitalism and is no longer popular.
what does remain popular (in fact is still the dominant view) is a similar idea that things that experience the world (humans, frogs, mice) are different from things that don't experience the world (potatoes, rocks, snowflakes).
There is nothing wrong with the point Russell was making. It's not applicable here.
If anything, panpsychism is a simpler and more economic explanation of consciousness than meterialism. Because materialists think the universe consists mainly of dull matter, that in a few rare instances comes together to form brains that experience consciousness. This phenomenon is said to emerge from matter somehow in a process that is not understood.
Panpsychists say it's simpler than that. Awareness is a property that is fundamental to all matter. In some entities it is more complex than others because of the structure, but it doesn't "radically emerge" at any point. It's always there. It's a simpler and more elegant explanation of consciousness.
Thomas Nagel offers the definition of awarenss that it satisfies the question: "what is it like to be a bat... or something else?"
What is it like to be a human?
What is it like to be a dog?
What is it like to be a bat?
What is it like to be a spider?
What is it like to be a tree?
What is it like to be a crystal?
What is it like to be an atom?
If the answer, from the inside, is something more than "nothing" then that is "awareness".
at one time scientists believed that living things and non-living things were made of different material, accounting for the unique properties of living things.
this idea is called vitalism and is no longer popular.
what does remain popular (in fact is still the dominant view) is a similar idea that things that experience the world (humans, frogs, mice) are different from things that don't experience the world (potatoes, rocks, snowflakes).
That's not a good analogy. We are not postulating the existence of imaginary entities.
The fact is that things exist and they either have awareness or they don't. Materialists assume that things don't have awarenss unless it's proved that they do. But why make that assumption? Simply throwing arms in the air shouting "ridiculous" and "teapot" and "Thetans" is not an argument.
The only "thing" we have experience of being is ourselves. And we know that we are aware. So we know that at least some things are aware. We don't know for certain that there are things that exist that at unaware.
We have direct proof that a thing can be aware. (Ourselves)
We have no direct proof that a thing can be unaware.
Simply making the assertion that most things are unaware, and any other view is ridiculous, is not an argument.
at one time scientists believed that living things and non-living things were made of different material, accounting for the unique properties of living things.
this idea is called vitalism and is no longer popular.
what does remain popular (in fact is still the dominant view) is a similar idea that things that experience the world (humans, frogs, mice) are different from things that don't experience the world (potatoes, rocks, snowflakes).
It's not my argument. It's an argument made by Galen Stawson, an academic philosopher who's taught at Reading, Rutgers, MIT, Princeton, Oxford and elsewhere.
Why assume that things are unaware? The "thing" we have direct experience of being is ourselves, and we are aware. So we know that things can be aware, for certain. We don't know for certain if things can be unaware because we have no direct experience of being a thing which is unaware. We can speculate and guess that it is possible to be a thing that is unaware but it's difficult to prove.
