And let's not forget Michael: (arch)angel --> man --> (nothing) --> spirit.
A narrative gap is apparent here (and more generally in the JW understanding of resurrection = re-creation) which can only be covered with the use of an abstract substantive (e.g. "memory"); but if you look closer a similar gap is also implied in the previous step (Michael's "life" -- another abstraction -- being "transferred"); it is only less visible because it is "instant" (no temporal "blank" involved, but the logical problem is basically the same).
Why don't we feel the same gap in traditional terminology? Imo, because instead of abstractions we have imaginary "characters," placeholders for the "person" or "subject" or "self" (e.g. "spirit," "soul") -- the existence of which is taken for granted.
But more deeply the gap is inherent to language, in its basic narrative form. To tell anything you have to arbitrarily separate a subject (subjectum, hypostasis) from a verb (active or passive): "characters" and "action"; "things" and "events". Mythical metamorphoses, just like everyday "becoming," can't be expressed without distinguishing a "subject" which is ultimately an abstraction, from predicates: x was A and now x is A' -- but what is x, apart from A and A'?
It might be interesting (tip to WT historians here) to trace back when and how the notion of resurrection as re-creation developed in WT literature (and perhaps earlier, because annihilationism is not limited to the WT, but as far as I understand in common Adventist doctrine it is rather destruction than negation of the soul). To me it has definite (although most likely unconscious, and perhaps prophetic) similarities with 20th-century structuralism.
