Using the Jehovah's Witness Cases to Stimulate Student Thinking
Copyright Heldref Publications Mar/Apr 2008
| [Headnote] |
| ABSTRACT. Critics charge that social studies education often fails at the most rudimentary level because there is a tendency to "play it safe" by focusing on general abstractions while avoiding discussion of specific-and often times controversial-topics. In this article, the author argues that one way in which social studies teachers can overcome such criticisms centers around introducing students to what he labels the "Jehovah's Witness cases." He maintains that these cases can provide a springboard into the discussion of a number of controversies that are particularly relevant to student understanding of the contemporary American political process. |
Critics contend that social studies education at the precollegiate level in the United States has "little if any effect on teaching of the democratic creed or political values in general" (Erikson, Luttbeg, and Tedin 1988, 147). They cite studies that conclude "that whether or not students . . . [have] taken any civics courses . . . [is] largely irrelevant to their levels of political knowledge, political interest, political discussion, political efficacy, civil tolerance, political trust, and participatory orientation" (147). They maintain that there is little concrete evidence to "support the thinking of those who look to the civics curriculum in American schools as a major source of political socialization" (147).
More particularly, they allege that, too often, specific issues that are at the heart and soul of the democratic process are avoided because there is a fear, in Richard Merelman's words, that "discussing political values in the classroom invites controversy and division" (qtd. in Hennessy 1985, 197). There may be discussion of democratic values in the abstract, but specific questions are avoided because of the controversy that both teachers and administrators fear may result. Bernard Hennessy (1985) argues that the practice of democratic decision making "is neither learned about nor practiced" (198).
Focusing on Specifics
If the critics are correct (and research, along with substantial anecdotal evidence, seems to support their contentions), social studies teachers have a very real obligation to move beyond safe, noncontroversial, abstract generalizations. Interestingly, there are an almost infinite number of serious issues/ controversies that can be worked into lesson plans for teachers who recognize that learning to be an active participant in a democratic society will not be facilitated by teaching practices that are centered around "the rote memorization of precepts and . . . [the] do-good examples that characterize" far too much of what is labeled as social studies education in American schools (Hennessy 1985, 197).
Based on my more than thirty-five years of teaching experience and attempts to familiarize undergraduate college students with the complexities of First Amendment considerations within a pluralistic society, I believe there is no better place for the social studies teacher to begin an effort to focus on specifics than by introducing students to controversies revolving around questions germane to freedom of speech and religion. If asked in a public opinion poll, almost every respondent will indicate that he or she is a firm supporter of freedom of speech and religion. If, however, one moves beyond the generic, the percentage supporting freedom of speech and religion for those with whom they disagree will go into something approaching a free fall. Speaking specifically about freedom of the press, media scholars Melvin L. DeFleur and Everette E. Dennis (1998) correctly note the following:
Almost all Americans will nod vigorously in agreement if asked whether they believe in freedom of the press. It ranks with motherhood, the Marines, and the American flag as a source of national esteem. However, when pressed on some specific case-such as pornography, criticism of their favorite public figure, or unfavorable stories about themselves-their assent to a free press is likely to vanish. (497)
In this article, I suggest a specific topic the social studies teacher can incorporate into his or her lesson plans to bring this reality home to students. Some may find it controversial. A fear of entering into specific discussion of potentially controversial issues is one of the major problems, as previously noted, plaguing social studies education. However, even "hot-button" contemporary political issues can be successfully addressed in the classroom if the social studies teacher knows his or her material and approaches any discussion of such issues from a perspective that demonstrates respect for the multiplicity of views and opinions that inescapably evolve out of the dynamic process that is at the heart of a pluralistic democracy.
The Jehovah's Witness Cases
Few groups in the United States have contributed as much to the development of the basic protections afforded individual rights under the Constitution as the Jehovah's Witnesses. Professor Peter Irons (1999) notes that "between 1938 and 1955, usually assisted by ACLU lawyers, the Witnesses took forty-five cases to the Supreme Court and won thirty-six; not even the NAACP-victorious in twenty-nine of thirty-two cases during those years-matched this record" (335?36). At the beginning of the present century, the Witnesses are still marching to the Supreme Court to fight the attempts of local public officials to limit their proselytization activities.
There are probably few Americans who at one time have not opened their front door to be greeted by a member of this movement. The Witnesses have been described as "an intense and ruggedly evangelical order . . . [who] doggedly . . . spread their word, passing out millions of leaflets and pamphlets and attempting to proselytize anyone who . . . [will] listen" (Pember and Calvert 2005, 111).
According to The Dictionary of Contemporary Religion in the Western World, the Witnesses contend that "the interpretations of all other Christian churches are suspect since it is believed that these churches are under the control of the devil" (Partridge 2002, 258). The Dictionary adds that a major concern of the Witnesses "is to gain members . . . [and that] all existing members are obliged to be involved in 'publishing' . . . [for which] they are trained in how to approach people by means of 'proof texts'" (259). Members of the denomination "are enjoined to read only literature from their organization" (260).
To say the methods and message of the Jehovah's Witnesses have been unpopular with large numbers of the public is to engage in a profound understatement. In their religious fervor-many would argue religious fanaticism-along with a message of a predicted war of Armageddon, Witnesses have frequently challenged and offended substantial segments of the American population. The Dictionary of Contemporary Religion goes so far as to suggest that "Jehovah's Witnesses are . . . the most disliked of any minority, religious or ethnic, in the USA" (Partridge 2002, 260).
At times this public reaction has manifested itself in outright violence. Irons (1999) writes that after one of the Supreme Court's decisions centering around the refusal of Witness children to salute the American flag in public schools, "hundreds of attacks upon the Witnesses were reported to the Department of Justice" (341). Dennis J. Palumbo (1973) argues that "scores of demonstrations against the . . . Witnesses marked the climate of opinion" (133). In one incident, a "chief of police and deputy sheriff . . . forced a group of Witnesses to drink large doses of castor oil and . . . paraded the victims through the streets" (Irons 1999, 341). In another particularly horrifying case, "a Nebraska Witness was kidnapped, beaten, and castrated by vigilantes" (341). A memo written by two federal officials noted that "almost without exception, the flag and the flag salute . . . [could] be found as the percussion cap . . . [which set] off these acts" (341).
In the face of such a hostile public reaction, the Witnesses have been battling in the courts for decades in an effort to secure their right to engage in specific actions germane to their freedom of speech and religion in the face of attempts to restrict such rights. Laws basically directed at curtailing the activities of Witnesses were-and continue to be-promulgated by individuals and government officials who would undoubtedly argue most vehemently that they are firm supporters of the First Amendment-at least in the abstract. Such laws are often passed "without debate or legal advice" (Irons 1999, 335).
Distributing Literature and Saluting the Flag
Two areas of Jehovah's Witness litigation seem particularly relevant to basic social studies questions to which every student should be introduced.1 These are the cases the Witnesses have brought relating to their right to distribute literature (many would argue they seek to distribute inflammatory Witness propaganda) and the right of Witness children to refuse to salute the American flag in public schools. Three U.S. Supreme Court cases germane to literature distribution that social studies teachers might use are Lovell v. City of Griffin (1938), Schneider v. State of New Jersey (1939), and Watchtower Bible and Tract Society v. Village of Stratton (2002). Two flag salute cases are Minersville School Board v. Gobitis (1940) and West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette (1943).
Having students examine and discuss these cases will enable the teacher to achieve three important objectives that should go to the very core of social studies instruction genuinely structured toward improving both the quality and quantity of citizen participation vis-?-vis the contemporary political process. These three objectives are as follows:
1. Students need to recognize, as the founding fathers knew, that the end product of a "pure" democracy can be a tyranny by the majority. For example, what if a majority of voters in Mississippi were to vote in a free and open election that persons of the Jewish and Muslims faiths would be prohibited from holding religious services in that state? After all, persons of those two religious faiths are a distinct minority in Mississippi.
2. It is important that students appreciate that protecting individual rights and liberties consists of a great deal more than the mouthing of pious platitudes when one moves beyond the abstract to the specific. Almost 100 percent of those responding to surveys, as noted, suggest that they support freedom of speech and religion. At the same time, however, large percentages of respondents to such surveys suggest they would support arresting those who would burn an American flag as a form of political protest.
3. It is critical that students comprehend that efforts to restrict those rights and liberties guaranteed by the Constitution are often conducted insidiously, sometimes by the very persons and groups who claim to be most supportive of them. Instances of public school administrators who attempt to censor student publications through administrative edicts while simultaneously claiming to be staunch supporters of free speech occur regularly in schools and school districts throughout the nation.
Summary of the Cases
The three cases involving literature distribution by the Witnesses go to the very heart of protecting freedom of speech and religion. The Lovell case in 1938 centered around the efforts of a Witness to distribute pamphlets "without the city manager's permission . . . [which] a local law required" (Overbeck 2005, 77). What good, teachers should ask, is there in having freedom of speech and religion if one is not allowed to distribute that which he or she feels compelled to communicate? Do local and public officials have a right to determine who can distribute literature in a community?
The Schneider case involved a more sophisticated effort to limit distribution of Witness materials. Government officials attempted to circumvent the First Amendment by passing antilittering ordinances. The Witnesses again won when the court ruled "that a city indeed has a right to prevent littering, but it must do so by punishing the person who actually does the littering. . . . The person handing out a pamphlet cannot be punished even it the recipient later throws it away" (Overbeck, 78).
In the much more recent Watchtower Bible case, the Supreme Court overturned an ordinance passed by a small town in Ohio that "made it a misdemeanor for door-to-door 'canvassers' to promote 'any cause' without first obtaining a permit from the mayor's office" (Overbeck, 78). Writing for the court, Justice John Paul Stevens called the law "offensive-not only to the values protected by the First Amendment, but to the very notion of a free society."
The Gobitis and Barnette cases both involved essentially the same issue: the compulsory practice in public schools in which students were required to salute the American flag. Palumbo (1973) notes that Witness children refused to follow school policy because "they were taught by their religion that it [the American flag] . . . was a 'graven image'" (133). The Witnesses lost the Gobitis case in 1940, but three years later prevailed in the Barnette case. In the Barnette decision, Justice Robert Jackson wrote his memorable defense of individual liberty:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.
Historian Eric Foner (1998) calls the Barnette decision "a repudiation of the coercive patriotism of World War I . . . [and a ruling which] affirmed the sanctity of individual conscience even in times of crisis" (223). Palumbo emphasizes that
the refusal of the . . . Witness children to salute [the flag] . . . did not interfere with the rights of others: on the contrary, requiring the salute was an interference not only with religions liberty but with the entire realm of spiritual liberty, including freedom of speech. (134)
Irons (1999) suggests the decision "offered the Court's apology to Jehovah's Witnesses for their children's suffering" (345). Justice Jackson also noted in his opinion that "compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard."
Applicability to the Three Objectives
The Jehovah's Witness cases go directly to the heart of the three aforementioned objectives. First, they clearly illustrate the dangers in defining democratic government solely in terms of majority/minority power. The Constitution's framers were very aware of the dangers of a tyranny by the majority. James Madison, for example, was most concerned, as John C. Livingston and Robert George Thompson (1971) note, with how to protect "minority rights . . . against a factious majority" (85). One is faced, Livingston and Thompson point out, with something of a paradox: "The spirit of democracy require[s] that a majority prevail over a minority; then how is it possible to guard against the danger that the majority's voice will reflect its economic interests, its whims, its passions?" (85).
The oftentimes frenzied reaction of the majority public to the message and the messengers of the Jehovah's Witnesses exhibits this most graphically. But does the majority, students need to ask, have a right to control the methods and consequently the message of the Witnesses because they disagree so strongly?
The answer, the social studies teacher can suggest, at least under the form of democratic governance envisioned by the founding fathers, rests in a governing structure that is both democratic and constitutional. James MacGregor Burns and J. W. Peltason (1969) state that under a constitutional democracy, "there are recognized limits to what government may do, even a government emphasized in the earlier Lovell case, that speaks for a majority" (10). Most important, an "individual has certain basic rights that [he/she] enjoys merely because [that person] is a human being . . . the government may not deprive any person of . . . life, liberty, or property except by just and fair procedures of law" (10).
The teacher can use the Barnette case to facilitate discussion and debate in this regard. When it was suggested, for example, that the Witnesses go to the legislature to have the law requiring all children to salute the American flag in public schools changed, Justice Jackson in his opinion for the court declared: "The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials." Justice Jackson added emphatically that "one's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly . . . may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections."
The cases are similarly helpful in generating discussion regarding the importance of moving beyond the abstract to the specific. In the recent Watchtower Bible case, for example, the city did not argue that freedom of speech and press were unimportant or unprotected, at least in the abstract, by the First Amendment. Instead, as noted, they passed an ordinance that prohibited the distribution of materials door to door.
A general protection of freedom of speech, press, and religion is of limited societal significance if one is unable to communicate one's beliefs and opinions to others in the specific. Furthermore, it is worth remembering, as the court that the freedom to communicate one's beliefs and opinions is not limited in the specific to those who have access to the traditional agents of mass communication. The lonely pamphleteer, at least theoretically, should enjoy as much protection under the First Amendment as does the editor of The New York Times.
In this very context, the social studies teacher can also make an important point on how the courts have interpreted First Amendment protections vis-?-vis freedom of speech and religion. At the most basic level, the courts have ruled that "pure" speech is protected in most contexts but many actions are not. One could not, for example, claim that his or her First Amendment rights were being violated after being arrested for throwing paint on a politician to protest a particular position that politician had espoused. In the words of the legendary Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes writing in Schenck v. U.S. (1919), the first significant U.S. Supreme Court case addressing freedom of speech, "free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic."
The problem, as the Witness cases illustrate so well, is that frequently there is considerable disagreement in determining where "pure" speech ends and actions begin. Perhaps most familiar in this regard for students will be the debate centering around attempts to restrict what is labeled "hate speech" and laws directed at preventing persons from burning the American flag as a form of political protest. The oftentimes vociferous disagreement as to whether such actions constitute speech or action is similar to much of the litigation regarding efforts to limit Witness efforts to distribute their literature.
Perhaps most important, the social studies teacher can use the Jehovah's Witness cases to illustrate for students that the majority of censorship that occurs in America is likely covert and insidious. The attempt to use an antilittering ordinance to limit the Witnesses' evangelization efforts in the Schneider case epitomizes this tendency. Students need to recognize that censors-including too often, as noted earlier, public school officials-have used such "administrative tools" in numerous settings and on many occasions to disguise their true motives. One need only recall the attempts by public officials in the American South to employ administrative rules-such as parade permits-in efforts to destroy the civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s.
Conclusion
Few would accuse the Jehovah's Witnesses of being too cautious or exercising undue prudence in their efforts to win converts. One need only recall another Witness case, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942), to illustrate why many Americans are so opposed to the methods of this religious sect. In that case, a Witness was convicted for calling a police officer, among other things, a "damned Fascist" in a face-toface confrontation. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction on the grounds that the Witness had used what were termed fighting words. In the Chaplinsky decision, the court defined fighting words as expressions that "by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." The courts have suggested that there is no protection for such speech because, as Kent R. Middleton, William E. Lee, and Bill F. Chamberlin (2005) state, the "words . . . [are] prohibited because they provoke a breach of peace, not merely because their content offends" (47). Such words, in fact, are not so much speech, but more a direct action: they "amount to a slap in the face" (46).
Consequently, the social studies teacher needs to remind students that the U.S. Supreme Court has never construed the First Amendment to be an absolute. In perhaps the landmark freedom-of-speech case, Near v. Minnesota (1931), Chief Justice Charles Hughes wrote that the First Amendment tolerated prior censorship, but only under very rare circumstances. Wayne Overbeck (2005) notes that Hughes cited three such circumstances in the Near decision: "Prior censorship in the interest of national security, prior restraints . . . [which] might be proper to control obscenity and incitements to acts of violence" (64).
Importantly, however, the teacher also needs to emphasize the exceptional nature of such circumstances. One's right to speak freely and practice his or her religion in accord with the dictates of one's conscience are-except in very rare circumstances-beyond the control of government officials and those majorities of the public who may favor suppressing such rights at a particular moment.
In yet another Jehovah's Witness case, Martin v. City of Struthers (1943), the renowned U.S. Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black wrote that
the right of freedom of speech and press has broad scope. The authors of the First Amendment knew that novel and unconventional ideas might disturb the complacent, but they chose to encourage a freedom which they believed essential if vigorous enlightenment was ever to triumph over slothful ignorance.
These are noble words, words with which a vast majority of Americans would undoubtedly agree so long as they are directed toward an abstract principle. If they remain only abstract theory, however, they become nothing more than pious rhetoric that will be discarded by timid and frightened majorities at the first sign of conflict and controversy. It is the social studies teacher's obligation to move students beyond considerations of the abstract and theoretical. There is no better place to begin than by inviting students to study and discuss the Jehovah's Witness cases.
| [Sidebar] |
| Few groups in the United States have contributed as much to the development of the basic protections afforded individual rights under the Constitution as the Jehovah's Witnesses. |
| [Footnote] |
| NOTE |
| 1. The U.S. Supreme Court cases discussed in this article can also be accessed via the Internet on a variety of Web sites. Some provide full citations, others summaries. The U.S. Supreme Court Web site can be accessed at www.supremecourtus.gov. Two others sites that teachers might find helpful in this regard are www.law.cornell.edu and www.findlaw.com. |
| [Reference] |
| REFERENCES |
| Burns, J. M., and J. W. Peltason. 1969. Government by the people. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. |
| Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire. 1942. 315 U.S. 568. |
| DeFleur, M. L., and E. E. Dennis. 1998. Understanding mass communication. New York: Houghton Mifflin. |
| Erikson, R. S., N. R. Luttbeg, and K. L. Tedin. 1988. American public opinion: Its origins, content, and impact. New York: Macmillan. |
| Foner, E. 1998. The story of American freedom. New York: W. W. Norton. |
| Hennessy, B. 1985. Public opinion. Belmont, CA: Brooks/Cole. |
| Irons, P. 1999. A people's history of the Supreme Court. New York: Viking. |
| Livingston, J. C., and R. G. Thompson. 1971. The consent of the governed. New York: Macmillan. |
| Lovell v. City of Griffin. 1938. 303 U.S. 444. |
| Martin v. City of Struthers. 1943. 319 U.S. 141. |
| Middleton, K. R., W. E. Lee, and B. F. Chamberlin. 2005. The law of public communication. Boston: Pearson. |
| Minersville School Board v. Gobitis. 1940. 310 U.S. 586. |
| Near v. Minnesota. 1931. 283 U.S. 697. |
| Overbeck, W. 2005. Major principles of media law. Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth. |
| Palumbo, D. J. 1973. American politics. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. |
| Partridge, C. 2002. The dictionary of contemporary religion in the western world. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press. |
| Pember, D. R., and C. Calvert. 2005. Mass media law. New York: McGraw-Hill. |
| Schenck v. U.S. 1919. 249 U.S. 47. |
| Schneider v. State of New Jersey. 1939. 308 U.S. 147. |
| Watchtower Bible and Tract Society v. Village of Stratton. 2002. 536 U.S. 150. |
| West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette. 1943. 319 U.S. 624. |
| [Author Affiliation] |
| DAVID L. MARTINSON is a retired professor living in the Kansas City area. He taught at the collegiate level for more than thirty-five years before retiring at the end of the 2005 calendar year. He has written extensively on issues germane to social studies education at the secondary school level and has authored or coauthored more than 140 journal articles. He holds MA and PhD degrees from the University of Minnesota. |